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Executive Summary 
Introduction 
This report focuses on the school choice system in England, which is a key 
component of the market-based accountability that is central to raising standards. It 
seeks to inform the broad question of whether parental choice of school works well in 
an increasingly autonomous school system. With more than half of secondary 
schools converted or converting to academy status, there will be less direct oversight 
of schools. Hence more reliance will be placed on market-based accountability to 
ensure schools are kept up to the mark.  
It seems clear from the international evidence that some parents do not choose 
schools by placing a large weight on school performance. Besides the implication of 
this for individual students, this has a systemic impact in that poorly performing 
schools may be insufficiently pressurised into improvement if their admissions stay 
‘undeservedly’ high, and parental choice will be blunted as an accountability 
mechanism. This poses a policy dilemma: acknowledge parental support and allow a 
school to continue as it was, or intervene ‘against the market’.  
There are challenging questions here – there is little basis for describing some 
parental choices as ‘acceptable’ and others as ‘unacceptable’. Parents value other 
aspects of schools besides academic performance and different parents in different 
circumstances may evaluate the trade-off between these aspects in different ways. 
They may for valid reasons not necessarily always choose the highest performing 
school.  
There is continuing concern among policy makers about the attainment gap between 
disadvantaged students and their better-off peers. Since families making the 
identified choices are often thought of as coming disproportionately from 
disadvantaged families, this has a direct bearing on understanding this issue. 
A question to consider is whether there is any basis for seeking to influence these 
parental choices, in either a direct or indirect (‘nudge’-type) manner. Should parental 
preference be paramount in a school choice system, or should the state have some 
role through benevolent paternalism? 
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Literature Review 
The literature review contrasts economic and sociological theories of parental choice 
of schools and summarises the evidence for why there may be systematic 
differences in the ways that parents choose schools. 
Social class differences in school preferences emerge: middle classes tend to value 
performance and peer group; lower SES groups may look for accessibility, 
friendliness of staff and support for those of lower ability. This may lead lower SES 
groups to select themselves out of high performing schools either by prioritising 
school aspects other than academic performance, or to avoid possible rejection or 
failure. 
Disadvantaged families (by definition) have access to less in the way of resources, 
which can (a) limit the range of schools which they can consider due to transport 
costs, and (b) prevent them from accessing supplementary tuition. 
The middle classes tend to have access to higher quality information on schools and 
be more adept at using it. The publication of performance tables and Ofsted reports 
aims to level the playing field in this regard, but cannot compensate for ‘soft’ 
knowledge of local schools. More seriously, the complexity of the current system of 
school admissions makes it difficult to successfully state school preferences on the 
admissions form without the capacity to estimate chances of being allocate a place. 
Whilst differences in parental preferences for school characteristics are not 
amenable to policy intervention, it is possible to offer financial support or provide 
services to overcome income deficits. Many government interventions have 
attempted to compensate for the informational deficit that many families face: 
simplification of the admissions process to lower informational requirements is the 
most obvious route to improving the school choice experience for all parents. 
 
Analysis 
Our data analysis attempts to assess the scale of the issue.  We use the National 
Pupil Database (NPD) and adopt an econometric approach. We focus on simple, 
specific, quantitative questions, to estimate the proportion of students whose parents 
chose to send their child to one school despite there being a higher-performing 
school apparently with spare capacity, and to examine the characteristics of those 
parents.  
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Having identified students whose parents could apparently have chosen a higher-
performing school for them, we assess how much difference it would make to their 
academic performance to hypothetically re-assign them to other schools. This 
necessarily involves further modelling assumptions; to keep a degree of realism, we 
do not assign students to schools beyond the numbers that they currently take and 
the analysis is strongly dependent on assumptions we made about capacity.  We 
simulate such an assignment many times and average over the outcomes to 
evaluate the likely impact on attainment if these parents had chosen different 
schools. We derive our estimates of the impact of schools on pupil attainment from 
fixed effect regressions, which we cannot consider to represent causal relationships. 
A major difficulty in this report is that we are attempting to analyse parental 
preferences and school capacity without any data on preferences and only very 
imperfect data on capacity. Consequently, the results should be seen as tentative 
and exploratory.  
 
Results 
We estimate that between 5% and 10% of both secondary school students and 
primary school students could have chosen to attend a higher-performing school with 
spare capacity. Turning the question around, about 3% of secondary schools (1% of 
primary schools) appear to have places available despite performing better than their 
local competitors. We reiterate that these numbers are estimates, based on a set of 
strong assumptions, because there is no data available on the actual choices 
parents make, and only poor data on school capacity. 
The average percentage of such students in secondary schools is around 9% (10% 
of primary school students), but it is higher for disadvantaged students. Students 
who are FSM-eligible and live in deprived neighbourhoods are much more likely to 
be attending a school despite there being a local higher-performing school 
apparently with spare places. Asian students are less likely to meet this definition 
and Black students more likely. 
Bearing all the caveats in mind, our results show non-trivial gains for some groups in 
some places: some LAs might find average gains of between 10% and 20% of a 
pupil-level standard deviation of GCSE points score, if students chose to attend a 
higher-performing school. Gains appear to be slightly higher in primary schools, with 
gains in some LAs being 30-40% of a standard deviation.  Since these gains are 
predominantly for FSM-eligible students, they also serve to narrow the attainment 
gap. The mean gain for FSM-eligible students is around 2 GCSE grades per student, 
and the mean gain for non-FSM students is 1.6 grades. 
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Recommendations 
We cannot say on the basis of this study alone that (somehow) encouraging 
disadvantaged families to place greater weight on school performance when making 
school choices would be likely to increase overall attainment, and reduce the 
attainment gap; this study has much more modest ambitions as set out above. It is 
worth re-emphasising two things when interpreting these numbers. First, we have no 
data on parents’ chosen schools so can only infer their preferences from their local 
context and we have no data on true school capacity so have to rely on further 
assumptions to estimate capacity. Second, there are obviously other factors involved 
in parents’ choices of school and the fact that some are apparently not choosing the 
highest performing school may simply be reflecting that those other factors are 
important too.  
While this group of students (attending a low-performing school because they chose 
it) is of interest, another group (attending a low performing school because they 
could not get in to a higher-performing one) is more numerous and plays a greater 
role in explaining the attainment gap.  The proximity rule for school admissions is a 
large factor limiting choice for these students. 
Throughout this report we have emphasized the extent to which the analysis has 
needed to rely on assumptions. This problem arises from lack of data on parental 
preferences and school capacity. Such data could be obtained and we would 
recommend doing so if the study is to be followed up. We believe it would be highly 
risky to base policy proposals solely on the findings of the current study. 
If it were then shown to be the case that significant numbers of parents were making 
decisions for their children to attend schools other than the highest performing, then 
it might be appropriate to consider some of the policies discussed in the Evidence 
Review section.  
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the fundamental issues that all school systems have to deal with is which 
students should attend which schools. There are various ways that this can be done, 
but in England the system is based on parental choice. Families are invited to 
nominate a ranked list of preferred schools for their child. If there is space at these 
schools, then the parents’ choice is decisive. If a school is over-subscribed, then 
other criteria come into play, but the parents’ choices remain an important input into 
the assignment.  
This report focuses on one aspect of this system, analysing a particular type of 
choice made by parents that, in a sense made precise below, might be considered 
dysfunctional for the system.  The broad question is whether parental choice of 
school works well in an increasingly autonomous school system. With more than half 
of secondary schools converted or converting to academy status, there will be less 
direct oversight of schools. Hence more reliance will be placed on market-based 
accountability to ensure schools are kept up to the mark.  
In principle, market-based accountability should work well. There is a lot of 
information available on school performance, and parents’ choices are key to the 
outcome. The idea is that parents should base their choices largely on school 
academic performance, thereby keeping schools on their toes and ensuring high 
standards throughout the system. 
But it seems clear that at least some parents do not choose in this way.  There are 
two potential impacts: individual and systemic. The nature of the systemic impact is 
clear; poorly performing schools may be insufficiently pressurised into improvement 
if their admissions stay ‘undeservedly’ high, and parental choice will be blunted as an 
accountability mechanism. This rather abstract argument is illustrated by the case of 
Downhills primary school during 2012. This was a poorly-performing school that 
officials felt needed strong action to turn it around. Despite its poor performance and 
the nearby availability of other schools, the school continued to attract local support. 
This posed the policy dilemma: acknowledge parental support and allow the school 
to continue as it was, or intervene ‘against the market’.  
For the impact on the individual student, the standard economic argument would be 
that the parents making the choice took into account all of the aspects of the 
available schools and decided on balance that their child would be better off at the 
school they chose. The only counter arguments to this would be that the parents 
were mis-informed, or that the preferences underlying their choice were somehow 
inappropriate – for example, discounting the future too heavily.  
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There are a number of deep questions here – there is little basis for describing some 
choices as ‘acceptable’ and others as ‘unacceptable’. Parents value other aspects of 
schools besides academic  record and different parents in different circumstances 
may evaluate the trade-off between these aspects in different ways and not 
necessarily always choose the highest performing school. A second question is 
whether there is any basis for seeking to influence these choices, in either a direct or 
indirect (‘nudge’-type) manner. Should parental choice be paramount in a school 
choice system, or should the state have some role through benevolent paternalism? 
In the literature review we discuss attempts to understand some of these complex 
issues in, give an overview of how and why there exist social class differences in 
engagement with the school choice process, and review existing government 
attempts to overcome some of these differences. In our data analysis we begin to 
address the scale of the issue by focussing on simple, specific, quantitative 
questions: how many children may not be going to their highest performing available 
school?  How many low performing schools retain an “undeservedly” large number of 
pupils?  Who are the pupils who are not going to the best available school?  Are 
some groups of pupils over- or under-represented among them?  A more in-depth 
approach to these issues is beyond the time frame for this study, and – more 
importantly – beyond the capability of the available data.  
We attempt to answer these questions by examining parents who chose to send 
their child to one school despite there being a higher-performing school with spare 
capacity. We present three sets of results: 
 We quantify how many students appear to be in this category, and how many 
schools are high-performing but not full; 
 We identify the typical characteristics of the students in this category; 
 We carry out a counter-factual analysis: we hypothetically re-assign students to 
different schools in a way that takes more account of school performance and 
quantify the gain in mean attainment.  
A major limitation of this report is that we are attempting to analyse parental 
preferences and school capacity without any data on preferences and only very 
imperfect data on capacity. Consequently, the results should be seen as very 
tentative and exploratory. The way we attempt to deal with this is set out in the Data 
section below.  
Part of the backdrop for this report is continuing concern about the attainment gap 
between disadvantaged students and their better-off peers. International evidence 
suggests that this is particularly sizeable in England relative to other countries. Since 
we show that the parents making the identified choices are disproportionately from 
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disadvantaged families, our findings have a bearing on understanding this 
discussion.  
There is an important point to make, however, in thinking about the potential 
contribution of school assignment to the socio-economic attainment gap. The key 
distinction (and the empirical challenge that we deal with below) is between a 
student attending a low-performing school because they chose it, and attending a 
low performing school because they could not get in to a higher-performing one. This 
analysis tries to provide some scale and characterisation of the first phenomenon; 
we strongly believe that the second is far more important in explaining the attainment 
gap, and that the proximity rule for school admissions is a big part of that. 
The following section makes precise the definitions of all our terms, and describes 
the data. Section 3 counts and describes the families making such choices and 
section 4 reports the results of the counter-factual analysis. Finally, section 5 
concludes.  
2. Literature review 
 
It is known that in England secondary schools are socially stratified, with children 
from socially disadvantaged backgrounds distributed unevenly across schools. 
Segregation of disadvantaged pupils between schools could be a problem for 
reasons relating to wider cohesion within society, but also because schools with 
greater proportions of disadvantaged pupils face extra teaching and behavioural 
challenges and less advantageous peer effects, feeding into unequal educational 
quality between schools. These ‘school effects’ are known to account for 8-15 per 
cent of variance in student academic achievement (Reynolds, 1992); pupil peer 
effects in particular are known to impact on school/ pupil performance (Robertson 
and Symons, 2003; Dills, 2005; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009) and on how 
much or how little schools improve over time (Levacic and Woods, 2002). Although 
home background – rather than what school a child attends – is by far the most 
important factor in predicting how well a child will do at school, matters of school 
quality and composition remain important. Reducing segregation to ensure an even 
spread of disadvantaged pupils across schools could therefore be beneficial.  
Potential causes of stratification between schools arise from both supply of and 
demand for school places: 
1. On the supply side, schools may use overt admissions policies, such as selection 
by residence, ability, religious adherence, or more covert procedures, to ‘cream-
skim’ more able or easier to teach pupils.  
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2. On the demand side, actions of parents such as how they go about choosing 
schools, but also where they live and the extent to which they can afford to travel, 
affect which schools their children attend.  
This report looks at evidence as to why there are differences in the way that families 
from different social backgrounds choose schools, drawing on literature from both 
qualitative sociological and quantitative economic traditions. It uses findings from this 
literature to reflect on a set of government interventions that have been designed to 
improve the school choice experience for those currently most disadvantaged in the 
process. 
One overarching finding emerging from research is that parents on the whole do 
value their children’s schooling and they are concerned about matters of quality such 
as school academic performance and discipline. These desires for a high quality 
education for their child are typically balanced against a preference for a local school 
and consideration of the child’s wishes (Flatley et al., 2001; Bradley and Taylor, 
2007; Coldron et al., 2008). The desire for educational quality is borne out in house 
price data in the US and the UK, where high performing schools contribute  
significantly to urban house price variation (Black, 1999; Gibbons and Machin (2003; 
2008). There is also reasonably strong support for school choice. Data from the 2010 
British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey has shown that while 61% of parents with 
children aged 16 or under believe people ought to send their child to ‘the nearest 
state school’, a further 23% say they would only agree with this if ‘the quality and 
social mixes of pupils between schools was more equal’. Such a finding suggests 
concern about quality, as does the finding that 41% of parents feel it is acceptable 
for parents to avoid the nearest state school where this school’s exam performance 
is weaker than school exam performance elsewhere. Overall, 72% of parents in 
Britain believe they ought to have a ‘basic right to choose’ (Exley, 2011). High 
support for choice here might imply that it is valued intrinsically by parents (not 
merely as a means by which they can secure higher quality schools), though a US 
study has understandably shown that support for school choice tends to be lower in 
neighbourhoods where school quality is high (Brasington and Hite, 2012). 
a. Social inequalities in parental choice 
The observation that family school choice outcomes differ by social class is one 
which has been witnessed and documented a great deal in academic research. 
Studies of the impact of the 1988 Education Reform Act showed that families already 
advantaged were more likely to gain places at desirable schools than disadvantaged 
families (Conway, 1997; Levacic and Hardman, 1998; Reay, 1998). Burgess and 
Briggs (2006) have shown that pupils eligible for free school meals attend worse 
schools than those not eligible for free school meals living on the same street. In the 
US, Hastings et al. (2006a) have shown that low income families are less likely to 
exercise choice in a public school lottery system. DeLuca and Rosenblatt (2010) 
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show that the famous Moving to Opportunity relocation of disadvantaged families 
across the US did not particularly improve children’s achievement, principally 
because those moving either could not or chose not to access higher quality schools. 
And of course, where choice is only possible through house moves in a strict 
neighbourhood schooling system, it has been shown that children from low income 
and less-educated backgrounds experience lower attainment school peer groups 
(Black, 1998; Bayer and McMillan, 2005). 
However, empirical observations such as this contribute little to our understanding of 
why a relationship exists between school choice and social class. Without an 
understanding of family decision making processes contributing to differential school 
choice behaviour, researchers cannot predict the magnitude of the change in sorting 
between schools that is likely to result from a particular policy implementation, with 
the result that it is not possible to devise cost-effective policies likely to succeed in 
lowering social segregation and increasing educational equity.  
b. Economic models of parental choice 
Economic or rational choice models currently prevalent in the school literature 
present parents acting in a rational manner, making choices of school from well-
defined choice sets with the goal of maximising household well-being based on fixed 
preferences and subject to budget constraints. Although these reductionist models 
contradict a wide body of experimental evidence demonstrating that human 
behaviour deviates in systematic ways from the idealised utility maximiser (Tversky, 
1996), they can still be a useful approximation of human behaviour (Roth, 1996). In 
fact, arguably the school choice decision is better described in terms of this 
economic decision-making than many other decisions in life: it is usually a 
conscious, deliberate and considered decision, made in the presence of 
considerable information. 
Within this framework, it is possible to model parents as differing according to social 
class, or socio-economic status. Economists give three distinct explanations for why 
parents of different social classes choose different schools, described below. 
i. Income constraint 
In modelling social class differences in school choice decisions, the first perspective 
is that the tighter budget constraint of low income families is sufficient to explain their 
inability to purchase houses next to popular schools, pay for private tuition for 
entrance tests, or take long journeys to school.  Under this account, the underlying 
preferences of lower and middle class families for schools are no different.  The 
policy implications of this would be that social stratification between schools could be 
significantly lowered by reducing the costs of accessing schools for low income 
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families; for example, by designating places at schools for out-of-catchment children 
or by subsidising transport to school. 
However, econometric estimates of house location decision suggest this explanation 
is not sufficient on its own to explain observed school stratification. Bayer and 
McMillan’s research takes an area (San Francisco) where choice of school is only 
possible by moving house because strict residence requirements are in place and 
find significant evidence for differences in preferences in the sense that more 
educated parents are willing, other things being equal, to pay more for high quality 
schools (Bayer, 2000; Bayer and McMillan, 2005).  This finding is confirmed by 
Nesheim (2002), who uses a similar approach to estimate a correlation between 
parental education and willingness to pay for school quality (given income) of 0.59. 
Schneider et al. (2000) also find that the preferences of parents for certain schools 
are due in part to their ethnic and socio-economic status. 
ii. Different preferences for school quality 
Economic models can introduce a second reason for social class differences in 
school allocations by asserting that preferences for school quality will differ by 
parental background, with the utility derived from greater school quality being lower 
for low social background families. This may be because these families 
underestimate the importance of education for their children’s future earnings, or 
because they place a greater value on the family’s current well-being than on their 
future income status. This difference in preferences might manifest itself in several 
ways.  The family may be less willing to substitute consumption for school quality 
‘purchased’ through the housing market or transport costs. Alternatively, the family 
may calculate that the utility gain from superior school quality is not enough to offset 
utility loss from longer journeys to and from school. Furthermore, other aspects of 
the school environment may enter the utility function, and they might place significant 
utility on the child's own expected happiness at secondary school, thus favouring 
allowing their child to continue to be educated with friends. 
Hastings et al. (2006b) use outcomes from a randomised school lottery to show that 
variation in preferences for school quality may rationally arise because capacity to 
benefit differs across types of children.  They are able to show that the children of 
parents whose choices revealed a strong preference for academic quality 
experienced significant gains in test scores as a result of attending their chosen 
school, while children whose parents weighted academic characteristics less heavily 
experienced academic losses from choice. They therefore provided empirical 
support for the thesis that for children from backgrounds where education is valued 
less, gains from attending a high performing school could be limited, and so may be 
heavily outweighed by other objectives, such as a desire for proximity and same 
social background peers. 
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iii. Informational advantages 
A third economic explanation for differences in school choice strategies is that higher 
social background families are endowed with an informational advantage (from 
social networks, for example).  Parents naturally have special intimate knowledge of 
their child’s interests and needs in terms of education (Lubienski, 2008), but this 
knowledge can only be acted upon where there is sufficient information about school 
characteristics and qualities. Lee and Fitzgerald (1996) have argued that sufficiency 
and accuracy of acquired information about education quality are essential for 
rational parental choice. 
An informational advantage for middle class parents manifests itself in several ways.  
First, it gives these parents better measures of school quality.  Second, they select a 
school from a larger choice set.  Third, they have a superior ability to estimate the 
probabilities of acceptance at different schools, which is particularly important under 
a First Preference First (i.e. priority matching) choice system or an Equal 
Preferences system with limited stated options. 
Middle class parents draw on their skills and social capital to gain information about 
school performance and admissions policies in a number of ways. West and Pennell 
(1999) show that high socio-economic groups appear to have better information on, 
and understanding of, school performance via league tables.  Coldron et al. (2008) 
also report a social gradient in the use of formal sources of information regarding 
schools.  Mothers who had qualifications at level 4 or higher (degree level) were 
three times as likely to use formal sources as those who had no qualifications.  Also, 
families with parents who were in employment were more likely to use formal 
sources than either lone parent families or two-parent families where one or both 
parents did not work.  They also report that internet access was important to a 
family’s ability to access information about schools, which may place lower income 
families at a disadvantage in the process.  Overall though, the most highly valued 
information was obtained informally, through school visits and talking to other 
parents and staff.  Thus, parents with stronger social networks (social capital) were 
more likely to gain more useful information about local school quality and 
admissions. Survey data from the US supports the idea that social networks are 
more important than formal sources of knowledge about school choice (Hall, 2009), 
and Schneider et al. (2000) suggest that middle class parents have  stronger social 
networks of ‘high quality’ information, with lower income families only able to use 
social networks to access less reliable data. 
So, empirical evidence suggests multiple informational advantages are likely to be 
present for middle class parents.  However, this explanation is, again, necessarily 
partial because an understanding is needed of the costs of obtaining information for 
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different groups, relative to their own perceived benefits in holding this information.  It 
is perfectly possible that working class families place less value on this information. 
c. Qualitative sociological accounts of parental choice 
British qualitative sociological work since the 1990s has provided a rich descriptive 
base of evidence showing how families’ social class is instrumental in shaping the 
manner in which they interact with school choice processes. Social class is distinct 
from income and education level, being seen as an economic, social and cultural 
phenomenon:  
‘an identity and a lifestyle, and a set of perspectives on the social world 
and relationships in it…’ (Ball, 2003, page 6). 
Bourdieu (1986) holds that individuals bring to bear on their choices in life a series of 
assets or capital (economic, social and cultural). Middle class advantage in school 
choice processes comes via economic capital (advantage in terms of financial assets 
and income); social capital (the social networks relied upon to inform school choice 
decisions) and cultural capital (the attitudes and knowledge, defined by those in 
power, which makes the education system a comfortable and familiar place in which 
they can succeed easily). These assets are passed from one generation to another 
as the middle classes seek “relative advantage, social advancement and mobility” 
There are two parts to an argument explaining how a middle class advantage in 
school choice emerges.  First is the suggestion that choice has different meanings in 
different class contexts (Gewirtz et al., 1995).  This means that families of different 
social class backgrounds engage in the choice process differently. Second, and 
building on the first argument, the school choice mechanism in England requires 
time, effort, expense and skill; i.e.: 
[Resources and capital] that are unevenly distributed across the population 
but with which the middle class are particularly well endowed.  The 
education market with all its risks is well accommodated to the dispositions 
and interests of the middle class (Ball, 2003, page 173). 
Although the sociological studies claim the market favours the middle class, they 
also report that this group have a pessimistic view of the process of choice. Because 
the middle class believe that a child’s educational success is crucial to their 
maintenance of social position, it means that they perceive that the consequences of 
not securing the ‘right’ school place are very serious. This risk arises from multiple 
sources: uncertainty about true school quality; uncertainty about how their own child 
will respond to different settings; and a chance they will not be allocated their 
preferred school. 
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The middle class are not just characterised as being advantaged in the process of 
securing a place at a good school; they also have a very specific notion of what 
constitutes ‘good’, and this is crucial to understanding why markets are likely to 
become stratified.  Ball characterises middle class choice as being dominated by 
maximising a child's likely exam results where ‘the school is not represented as an 
independent variable with qualities of its own separate from its intake’ (Ball, 2003, 
page 169).  In other words, middle class parents have a narrow conception of quality 
as being analogous with expected test scores, and believe that the quality of a 
school largely depends on its peer group, almost irrespective of the quality of 
instruction.   
Empirical survey evidence provided only limited support for the assertion that the 
middle classes choose schools based on peer group, but it is important to interpret 
all reported surveys somewhat cautiously because survey responses may not give 
an accurate estimate of parents' true preferences. For example, stated preferences 
may be altered to fit social norms, emphasising a high value for education quality 
and child's happiness and potentially downplaying concerns for a school's social and 
racial composition. So, while the BSA survey in 2010 showed that 41% of parents 
say it is acceptable to avoid a nearby school on the basis of its exam results, only 
28% say it is acceptable to avoid that school on the basis of ‘the backgrounds of 
pupils who go there’ (Exley, 2012a). 
By contrast, according to Reay and Ball, ‘working-class patterns of educational 
choice are characterised by ambivalence, and appear to be as much about the 
avoidance of anxiety, failure and rejection as they are about ‘choosing a good school 
for my child’ (Reay and Ball, 1997, page 93). There are two parts to this argument.  
First, the ambivalence is consistent with working class families viewing their child's 
characteristics as ‘fixed’ and not susceptible to school effects. The second part of the 
argument emphasises the contradictions and compromises in making choices 
because of the potential negative consequences of entering (or indeed being denied 
access to) a middle class school. 
Such choices could set working-class children to fail in individualised, 
publicly humiliating ways in predominantly middle-class, high-achieving 
schools as opposed to the more masked, shared processes through which 
they fail (or are relatively successful) in local, inner city comprehensives. 
(Reay and Ball, 1997, page 97) 
Rather than choosing popular, high reputation schools, working class preferences 
are strongly shaped by parents’ own economic position within the market and also 
parents’ (often negative) experience of school (Woods, 1993). Bussell (1998) also 
argues that parents from lower socio-economic backgrounds are less well informed 
and tend to choose later than those from higher socio-economic backgrounds.  
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Working class parents prioritise and value not exam results (as middle class parents 
do) but the accessibility and friendliness of teachers, relying on ‘gut feeling’/intuition 
or favouring a sense of ‘being at home’.  Pupil peers are regarded equally as 
important as they are for middle class families, but rather than seeking ‘like’ in terms 
of middle class high achievers, working class parents value the presence of children 
like their own, valuing what Coldron et al. (2010) term the ‘benefits of solidarity’, 
leading them to ‘opt for’ segregation. Often working class parents are impressed 
when schools give positive attention to less academically inclined pupils rather than 
focusing primarily on able students (Reay and Ball, 1997). Surveys show that in 
lower social class families the child's wishes are often decisive while for middle class 
parents the child's input into the process is limited (Coldron and Boulton, 1991; Ball, 
1993).  The result is that within middle class norms, working class families may 
appear to be `bad choosers', but this is entirely a cultural judgement (Reay and Ball, 
1997).  
Several US studies are also able to show robustly that low-income parents place 
lower value on academic characteristics when choosing schools (Fossey, 1994; 
Armor and Peiser, 1998; Schneider and Buckley, 2002; Jacob and Lefgren, 2007; 
Hastings et al., 2006a). Government research has also indicated that parents with 
less experience of formal education (i.e. those who left school at an earlier age) are 
less likely to feel confident in their ability to support their child’s learning and 
development (Peters et al., 2009; TNS-BMRB, 2010). However, Coldron et al. (2008) 
use survey findings to temper a ‘deficit model’ of parents from lower socioeconomic 
groups, as is prevalent in literature contrasting ‘skilled choosers’ and ‘disconnected 
choosers’ (Gewirtz et al., 1995) and ‘alert’ versus ‘inert’ (Echols and Willms, 1992), 
stating: 
It is a widespread assumption that parents from lower socioeconomic 
groups are being denied access because they are less able to 
understand the admissions process and therefore less able to 
successfully negotiate it. We found no evidence to support this. While 
more educated parents were likely to access more information very few 
parents felt they were lacking basic information about secondary schools 
and there was no evidence that parents who were less educated had any 
reduced chance of gaining their first preference. (Coldron et al., 2008, 
page vii) 
Coldron et al. confirm that working class parents do not want to engage in the school 
choice process in the same manner as the middle classes do, and that they have 
different aspirations in terms of schools they wish their children to attend. However, 
overall there is an acknowledgement that working class cultures and preferences not 
only produce but are produced by economic circumstances. Working class parents 
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choose differently from middle class parents in part because their decision-making 
involves a rational adjustment to a structural lack of options: 
‘the most improbable practices are … excluded, as unthinkable, by a kind of 
immediate submission to order that inclines agents to make a virtue out of 
necessity, that is, to refuse what is anyway denied’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 54).  
‘Far from being ill considered, this reluctance represents a powerful common-
sense logic in which to refuse to choose what is not permitted offers a 
preferable option to choices which contain the risk of humiliation and rejection’ 
(Reay and Ball, 1997: 91) 
d. Government interventions 
Sociological and economic literature described above points towards a number of 
reasons as to why parents in different social class groups engage differently with 
school choice processes. Choice carries different meanings among different classes; 
while middle class parents understand it as part of maximising their child’s future 
academic achievement (surrounding children with ‘like’ high achieving peers), 
working class parents focus on aspects of schooling such as friendliness, inclusion 
and a focus on the less academically able. It is morally quite hard for government to 
justify policies that deliberately seek to manipulate existing parental preferences. 
Instead, interventions might best focus on overcoming informational deficits, 
compensating for lower incomes, and/or raising chances of acceptance for 
disadvantaged children at high quality schools. Of course, by simply raising potential 
access to a greater number of schools it necessarily lowers risk of rejection and so 
may, in fact, indirectly change preferences for families with lower personal 
confidence in the process. 
i. Overcoming information deficits 
Government interventions to improve access to useful information regarding school 
choice should be uncontroversial, especially if the information sources are open to all 
and do not seek to explicitly manipulate existing preferences for particular types of 
schools. That said, there are many choices to make over what types of information to 
make available, carefully accounting for whether these sources are equally available 
and understandable for all parents, regardless of socioeconomic, racial, and 
educational status. It is possible that high quality, yet inaccessible, information could 
exacerbate existing inequalities, for example. Inaccessibility is only part of the 
problem since we also want parents to be able to make a rational choice based on 
the available information. 
In this section, some examples of reforms to available information are listed, grouped 
from the least to the most personalised types of information. Personalised 
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approaches to information are very expensive, but may be more straightforward to 
navigate. 
Types of information sources 
Research has shown that families gain information on schools from a wide variety of 
sources, both formal and informal. The strengths and weaknesses of these sources 
are summarised by Hall (2009) and replicated here in Table 1. 
Types of 
information 
Sources Strengths Weaknesses 
Informal/ 
relational 
Friends 
Extended 
family 
Families in 
schools 
Co-workers 
High levels of trust 
in the source 
Less “costly” for the 
chooser in terms of 
time and energy 
spent 
Not always accurate 
Social networks are 
culturally/socially 
bound 
Favour higher-income, 
more educated families 
Formal/ 
Media 
Television 
Radio 
Newspaper 
Community 
centre 
Politicians 
Internet/ web-
based 
Able to reach many 
people 
simultaneously 
Multiple forms 
available 
Scarce in terms of 
educational information 
Questionable reliability 
Need for choosers to 
have access to 
electronic media or 
have high level of 
literacy skills 
School-
based 
Brochures 
Newsletters 
Web-pages 
Application 
materials 
Staff/administr
ation 
PTA 
Important factual 
and procedural 
information 
Creates connection 
between family and 
school 
Biased in favour of 
school 
Propaganda 
Extensive “red tape” 
Language usually 
technical or advanced 
Intimidating – 
especially for younger 
and less educated 
parents 
Source: Hall (2009) (table 2.1) 
 21 
 
Formal sources of information are clearly the most amenable to policy manipulation, 
but they may not be the most important. Research by Brasington and Hite (2012) 
has shown that parental subjective opinions about schools are at least as important 
as formal exam performance tables in fuelling demand for school choice. Also, 
decision-making may not currently follow systematic, rational approaches so there is 
room for informational interventions to reflect this. Schneider et al. (1999) report on 
parents’ use of ‘heuristics’ or ‘shortcuts’ in making judgements about schools based 
on visual cues (for example a lack of broken windows or graffiti) which do 
successfully allow parents to identify higher performing institutions.  The possibility of 
improving school choices among less affluent families is argued to be real, because:  
“even in the absence of encyclopedic information, visual cues can lead 
parents to choose schools that perform well on the dimensions of 
education about which they care.” (Schneider et al., 1999: 738).  
Identifying the most effective schools 
For school choice to be effective in raising achievement for children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, it is necessary to show that parents are capable of 
identifying effective schools. The evidence for this is rather mixed. In England, for 
example, we know that while many are interested in school performance tables, only 
36% of all those who use such tables report an interest in value added scores, 
arguably the most accurate published measure of school quality (Coldron et al., 
2008).  By contrast, 80% of all those looking at performance tables are interested in 
unadjusted school GCSE/A-level results, even though the overwhelming determinant 
of these is not the quality of instruction pupils receive (rather the prior attainment of 
pupils attending a school). 
Subjective judgements on the part of parents rather than a reliance on solid data 
may explain mixed research findings regarding the impact of government school 
choice programmes on pupil outcomes. Looking at the experiences of ‘lottery winner’ 
pupils attending New York charter schools, Hoxby and Murarka (2009) have found 
small positive effects of school choice on maths and reading scores. Hastings and 
Weinstein (2008) have also concluded that where lottery winning parents choose 
schools with higher exam scores, pupil test scores increase. Deming et al. (2011) 
have shown that lottery winning students whose parents have exercised choice are 
more likely than others in their neighbourhood to graduate from high school, attend 
elite universities and gain bachelor’s degrees. However Cullen et al. (2003 – see 
also Cullen and Jacob, 2009) cast doubt on such findings in their research on 
Chicago public schools. They find that in a context of lottery allocation to the most 
sought after school programmes, lottery winner children do attend schools with 
higher peer achievement rates and lower levels of poverty, but they derive no clear 
benefit regarding standardized test scores. This evidence, combined with English 
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surveys of school quality metrics used by parents, suggests we cannot conclusively 
assert that parents will necessarily choose a school that maximizes their child’s 
chances of exam success. 
Errors by parents in the school choice process have been shown to occur in 
research from around the world. Using data from China, Lai et al. (2008) showed that 
students from low-income households were more likely to make judgment errors in 
the school choice process, resulting in their attendance at lower quality schools. 
Lucas and Mbiti (2011) also found that girls and lower achieving students in primary 
schools in Kenya were more likely to make mistakes in school selection processes 
such as coding errors or applying to schools where they had zero chance of gaining 
a place. However, on a more positive note, Ajayi (2011) found that where talented 
students from low-quality primary schools in Ghana were less likely to apply for more 
selective secondary school places, reforms providing students and parents with 
more information eliminated some of this disparity, thereby encouraging economic 
mobility. 
League tables and school brochures 
One measure often promoted by governments as part of school choice programmes 
is an enhanced provision of basic, accessible information in order to counter 
imbalances in knowledge between middle and working class families. Measures in 
this vein include not just providing detailed information about schools themselves, 
but also about parents’ chances of gaining places at different schools. 
As indicated earlier in this review, arguably the most reliable information available on 
school quality is that which reports a school’s value added. However, few parents 
make use of such data. That said, unadjusted school test scores do provide some 
indication of school quality, because they indicate a presence of high achieving 
peers (and therefore positive peer effects known to be beneficial for student 
achievement). Looking at school performance tables in England, however, Allen and 
Burgess (2011) find that leading performance measures used by parents to aid them 
in their school choices are not particularly comprehensible or relevant for choosing a 
school that maximizes a child’s likely attainment. Allen and Burgess propose an 
alternative measure scoring more highly in terms of relevance and comprehensibility, 
but overall they also point to trade-offs between functionality and relevance and 
between comprehensibility and relevance in the use of school performance data. 
Providing information to working class and disadvantaged parents has been shown 
to make a difference in terms of family school choice aspirations. Analysing data 
from a field experiment in the Charlotte Mecklenburg Public School district in North 
Carolina, Hastings et al. (2007) showed that provision of simplified information 
sheets to parents showing school test scores and the odds of gaining places at 
different schools led low income parents to choose schools with higher test scores, 
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ultimately focusing to a greater degree on school academic performance. Attending 
such schools (and in the Charlotte Mecklenburg district pupils had a non-zero 
chance of attending non-neighbourhood schools because places were allocated via 
a lottery, after neighbourhood pupils had been accommodated) was also shown to 
increase test scores for students (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008). As discussed 
earlier, empirical evidence such as this frequently (though not consistently) implies 
that school choice will most effectively increase academic achievement for 
disadvantaged students when parents have easy access to test score information 
and have good options to choose from. 
There are limits to the types of information that it is possible to deliver in this way. 
School-based information is often limited in scope as “it is factual, procedural 
information, aimed at managing the logistical problems created by choice” (Archbald, 
1988, p. 55). Printed, web-based, and other mass communications typical of school-
based information can also be considered by families to be incomplete so more 
informal methods of dissemination (such as school visits) are also important. Further 
nuanced issues exist in arguments about providing school performance data relating 
to the dissemination, availability, and usability of information in the educational 
arena. There are issues of cost and incentive for schools to make it a point to 
communicate effectively with all potential choosers. “Families unaware of [choice 
schools] are likely to be the most expensive to inform” (Archbald, 1988, p. 224) and, 
as long as the choice school’s enrolment meets the school’s desired levels, there is 
little incentive – and heightened risk – in informing these families at all. For example, 
“information equalizing awareness of [choice schools] could diminish [their] 
specialness by lowering barriers to access and increasing the proportion of 
applications from families less likely to support academic achievement and the 
[choice schools’] specialized programs” (Archbald, 1988, p. 225). 
School search websites 
Recent developments in school choice information have included growing numbers 
of internet-based resources for parents designed to inform them and help them make 
decisions about schools. These sites have potential advantages over standard 
brochures because information can be personalised to meet the specific needs of 
the family. The increasing importance of school choice websites in educational 
marketplaces has been documented by authors such as Buckley and Schneider 
(2007) and Lubienski (2008) but also critiqued, because a clear ‘digital divide’ exists 
in which parents access (indeed are able to access) such websites and also 
because such websites typically include only simplistic information reporting 
unadjusted test scores for schools but not more sophisticated measures of school 
performance such as value added scores.  
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The best evaluated example of a school search website is ‘Smart Choices’, a 
website providing information to parents about schools in Hartford, Connecticut 
(described in Dougherty et al., 2010). It covers 200 schools and programmes in the 
city of Hartford plus 17 nearby suburban towns (in both English and Spanish). 
Parents enter their address and child’s grade level and can specify preferences for 
schools in terms of distance from home, test scores and racial balance. The website 
aims to be a one-stop-shop by including links to all the school websites, transport 
information and application forms. The site reports two measures of school 
attainment: the ‘test gain’, which is a simple value added score for schools and raw 
test scores as the most common quality indicator in the state. 
The site has been shown to be successful in changing the stated preferences of 
parents on application forms. One third of people who use the site change their top 
preference as a result and one third ‘clarify’ their choice. The third who change their 
minds do so on the basis of school test scores, test gains and racial balance. 
However, not surprisingly parents do continue to show a strong preference for 
distance, even after using the site. 
The major downside to promoting choice via a site such as this is that the digital 
divide still clearly persists. It has proved necessary to engage in outreach efforts to 
overcome this digital divide and support certain parents in using the site. 
Bespoke advice services 
The most personalised forms of informational support hold the possibility of helping 
parents understand data that might otherwise be impossible to navigate. Choice 
Advisers in England were introduced in 2006 in order to provide targeted face-to-
face and telephone advice about schools to less affluent parents, with the aim of 
‘empowering’ them to better negotiate school admissions processes and aspire to 
higher performing schools for their children: 
‘Choice Advice will enable those parents who find it hardest to navigate the 
secondary school admissions system to make informed and realistic decisions 
about which schools to apply for in the best interests of their child. This will 
place these families on a level playing field with other families who are better 
able to navigate the admissions process’. (Department for Children, Schools 
and Families website, 2009) 
In 2010, there were approximately 250 Choice Advisers operating in 150 local 
authorities across England via a range of different service delivery ‘models’. 
Research by Stiell et al. (2008) evaluating Choice Advice in 15 English local 
authorities has shown the service to be valuable for parents. However, limits are also 
highlighted in terms of how far Choice Advice as a policy can ever promote ‘fair 
admissions’. The labour intensive nature of personalised, targeted advice for 
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vulnerable parents means numbers of parents reached will only ever be modest. 
Furthermore, Coldron et al. (2009) have critiqued Choice Advice as being premised 
on a ‘flawed characterization of the problem’, labelling  parents with lower incomes 
as ‘deficient’ without sufficiently acknowledging matters such as inequitable access 
to schools feeding into disadvantaged parents’ rational ambivalence about choice.  
Qualitative work on the Choice Advice service in England has also been carried out 
by Exley (2009; 2012b) showing how Choice Advisers have borne the brunt of 
contradictions within government policy. Advisers are overwhelmed by parental 
demand for their service, required to ‘raise aspirations’ at the same time as 
emphasising structural limits or ‘realism’ for parents, managing and containing 
expectations in a context of heavily restricted access to desirable schools. 
Choice advisors in England were modelled on Parent Information Centers in the US, 
which were part of an initiative to encourage applications to ‘magnet schools’. At 
their best, these centres have been described by Cookson (1994, p. 136) as 
‘community resources that bring schools and families together and act as benign 
brokers of educational choice’. Centres such as these are an attempt to move 
beyond simple provision of written factual information for parents, countering middle 
class advantage by additionally helping less affluent parents navigate the system. As 
a policy, they stood alongside more conventional approaches such as the distribution 
of information and application forms directly to parents, printed brochures, 
transportation to school tour session, advertising in local media, and so on (Hall, 
2009). 
ii. Overcoming income constraints 
Coldron et al. (2008) document the explicit means by which the social, economic and 
cultural capital of a family can be used to maximise chances of securing a place at a 
preferred school.  They report that 8% of parents with children now at state 
maintained secondary schools admitted to coaching children for entrance tests; 5% 
reported ensuring their child was in the correct feeder primary school; 4% reported 
paying for extra tuition; 4% reported arranging extra-curricular activities; 3% reported 
moving or renting a house in the correct catchment area; 1% reported joining a 
church or place of worship; and 1% reported asking someone with influence in the 
process to recommend the child. 
While it is clearly very difficult for government policy to intervene to compensate for 
many of these activities, there are two clear areas where income support could be 
given to low income families: private tuition for entrance tests and transport cost 
support. 
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Private tuition 
In England, there remain 164 grammar schools (educating 4% of all pupils), many of 
which are located in wholly selective areas such as Kent, Lincolnshire, 
Buckinghamshire, Trafford and Calderdale. Furthermore, 4% of comprehensive 
schools offer at least 10% of their places to children who pass an aptitude or 
knowledge test (Allen et al., 2012b). 
State-funded private tutoring, i.e. giving intensive tuition to individual pupils in short, 
regular sessions over a set time period, has been widely used in policy interventions 
across the world (see Chappell et al., 2010 and Torgerson et al., 2011, for reviews). 
They have largely been shown to be very effective, with the most successful 
schemes appearing to be those that help underperforming children catch up, rather 
than support low income children with high academic potential. 
Support for school transport costs 
Exercising a choice to attend a non-local school usually involves greater travel 
distances on routes that are not served by dedicated school transport, such as 
school buses. This clearly has substantial environmental and congestion 
implications, though it is possible that these are outweighed by the benefits to 
society of operating a choice system (Wilson et al., 2007). 
Interventions to support school transportation in the US, Australia and NZ, either 
through bus provision or public transport subsides, have always focused on cost of 
travel to the child’s nearest school and so are not facilitating choice. This is also true 
of UK initiatives such as the pilot yellow bus schemes (Steer Davies Gleave, 2003). 
Past UK governments have recognised the need to address inequalities in school 
access. In 2006, alongside policies for Choice Advice in England, government 
sought to facilitate travel for working class children to schools beyond their 
neighbourhood schools (2005 White Paper and 2006 Education and Inspections 
Act). However, outside very urban areas where public transport is well-functioning, it 
is hard to devise policies to enable choice. Low income families are less likely to own 
a car and far less likely to use personal transport for daily home-to-school travel 
(Department for Transport, 2011). For those low income families who lack the means 
(the spare car) and the time (in parents’ travel time) to make journeys in a personal 
car, interventions may be restricted to offering private taxi services or paying other 
families making the journey to take additional children in their car. 
iii. Reforming school admissions policies 
The current system of school allocation allows parents to express a preference for 
between three and six schools, but given constrained capacity (with all spare 
capacity located in unpopular schools) oversubscription criteria act as a rationing 
device, allocating pupils to schools.  Current oversubscription criteria typically used 
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by schools include priority for younger siblings of pupils already at the school, 
proximity to home or catchment areas, adherence to a particular religion and 
performance in an academic test (see West et al., 2009). Neighbourhood schooling 
forces parents to choose a school by choosing a place of residence.  This has the 
advantage that all the families will live near to the school, thus minimising school 
journeys, allowing collective progression of primary school friends and creating a 
sense of community.  The disadvantage is that worse-off families are powerless to 
access high performing schools since it ties access to the school tightly to residence 
and therefore to house prices, implying income-segregated communities (although 
Allen et al., 2010, suggest the phenomenon of strategic house-moving between the 
ages of 5 and 10 may be overstated). 
Although admissions policies are seen as critical to whether parental choice is 
possible, in a system with constrained capacity with most parents preferring 
academically successful schools, the reality is that it is impossible to satisfy all 
choices, with popular schools using their admissions policies to decide who is 
admitted. In this sense, at any given point in time the system is a zero sum game 
where every successful allocation of a place at a preferred school denies another 
parent their choice.  Altering the admissions policies, for example to make greater 
use of lotteries or banding (taking equal numbers across the ability distribution) does 
nothing to facilitate greater parental satisfaction (unless it alters the long-run relative 
popularity of schools); admissions policies will simply alter the set of parents who are 
able to achieve their choice of school. 
Critically though, school admission policy reforms can be more, or less, 
advantageous to low-income families. Schooling markets in England, as they are 
currently constructed, appear to have a tendency to become stratified where schools 
are able to control their own admissions. Schools are more segregated than 
neighbourhoods in almost all parts of England and Burgess et al. (2007) and Allen 
(2007) both show that this post-residential sorting is greatest in areas of higher 
population density and where there are larger proportions of autonomous schools. 
Allen and West (2011) confirm that autonomous schools such as faith voluntary-
aided schools do have intakes that are more socially advantaged than their direct 
neighbourhoods. It is understandable that schools choose to construct admissions 
policies that favour more advantaged families and one goal of the pupil premium is to 
increase the incentives for attracting free school meals pupils to the school. 
Reforms that are successful in supporting low income families in making choices are 
likely to simplify admissions overall, thus lowering informational barriers, and 
lowering reliance on family income or cultural capital. For example, reducing reliance 
on complex tests of religiosity, on specialist subject aptitude and location of family 
home could all be helpful, as could increased use of lotteries and banding. Allen et 
al. (2012b) showed that the tightening of the School Admission Code between 2002 
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and 2010 successfully lowered school stratification. However, reforms must be 
carefully introduced since, for example, school banding has been misused by 
schools to select by ability (West et al., 2009) and lotteries will not necessarily lower 
social stratification if they still maintain strict geographical residence requirements as 
happened in Brighton and Hove (Allen et al., 2012a). 
e. Concluding remarks 
The literature suggests that what parents look for in a school may vary by social 
class: middle classes tend to value performance and peer group; lower SES groups 
may look for accessibility, friendliness of staff and support for those of lower ability. 
This may lead lower SES groups to select themselves out of high performing schools 
to avoid possible rejection or failure. These social class differences in preferences 
for schools are not particularly open to policy intervention. 
Disadvantaged families (by definition) have access to less in the way of resources, 
which can (a) limit the range of schools which they can consider due to transport 
costs, and (b) prevent them from accessing supplementary tuition. It is possible to 
offer financial support or provide services to overcome these deficits. 
Finally, the middle classes tend to have access to higher quality information on 
schools and be more adept at using it. The publication of performance tables and 
Ofsted reports aims to level the playing field in this regard, but cannot compensate 
for ‘soft’ knowledge of local schools. More seriously, the complexity of the current 
system of school admissions makes it difficult to successfully state school 
preferences on the admissions form without the capacity to estimate chances of 
being allocate a place. Choice advice services aimed to help lower SES groups 
navigate our very complex system of admissions. A more straightforward policy 
solution would be to lower the informational constraints by simplifying school 
admissions and placing restrictions on permissible oversubscription criteria. For 
example, a combination of catchment areas and lotteries for ‘choice’ places provides 
clear and equal probabilities of the chances of success in the school choice process. 
 
3. Analysis: Concepts, definitions and data 
 
The literature review makes clear that not all families make choices about their 
children’s  schooling that might be considered optimal from a systemic point of view. 
It also sets out some of the ways in which these issues might be addressed or 
mitigated.   
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In this section we address the prior scoping question: what is the potential scale of 
the issue?  How many children go to schools other than the one that we might 
consider to be their highest performing available school?  And who are these 
children?  What difference would it make to overall student attainment if they did go 
to the “best” school available to them?  Below we undertake an analysis of school 
admissions to try and assess the likely answers to these questions. This is an 
exploratory analysis of the possible numbers involved. We also discuss the 
sensitivity of our results to some of the assumptions we are forced to make.  
 
a. Modelling school choices 
The basic empirical problem we face is trying to model the school choices that 
families make without data on the choices they stated on the LA applications forms1. 
Instead, the best we can do is to infer their preferences from the schools available to 
them, and the school which the child actual attends. We focus on the interpretation 
of the case of a child attending school A when school B is a better performing school 
and potentially available to that child. There are two possibilities: the child actually 
chose school B but was not offered a place and went instead to school A, or the child 
chose school A and was offered a place. We want to identify the latter instances and 
ignore the former. Necessarily, this is an approximation.  
We can make some progress on this given: information on the admissions system 
across England and its permissible priority rules; knowledge of the important factors 
for the demand for school places; and data about the characteristics and location of 
the families and schools. For our purposes, the two key factors are proximity and 
capacity. We assume that the possibility that the pupil applied to the high performing 
school but was not admitted is ruled out if: it is near the pupil’s home, and if it has 
spare capacity. The proximity rule is ubiquitous in school admissions arrangements 
and has a central influence on preferences and admissions, so we need to rule out 
the possibility that the family simply lived too far away from the school. Second, 
schools can refuse entry to students once they have hit their capacity, so we also 
need to focus on cases of schools with capacity.  
Note that we also have no information on sibling relationships and therefore the 
admission route into schools that these provide.  Nor does the NPD contain 
measures of the faith professed by a child and its family. 
In summary, lacking data on the actual stated choices of parents, we use the 
National Pupil Database to help us approximately identify cases of students 
attending a particular school despite a higher-performing one being available.  
                                            
1
 Such data is only held by LAs, and not known to DfE centrally.  
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b. Definitions 
The key outcome variable at student level is: “does this student have a local school 
with at least N spare places which also has higher performance level than the 
current school?” We now define all these terms in detail. Again, we want to make 
explicit and clear the strong assumptions we need to make in order to be able to get 
any sense of scale of this phenomenon.  Our view is that these assumptions mean 
our estimates are lower bounds on the truth.  
Local: this is based on a standard sub-unit of Census Geography, the Lower Layer 
Super Output Area (LLSOA). These are very small units, containing on average 
about 1,500 residents (minimum of 1000) and about 15 – 20 students from a single 
year group. Our criterion is: if at least 2 pupils (across year groups) within an LLSOA 
attend a specific school, that school is deemed to be within the catchment area of all 
pupils in that LLSOA. That is to say, a pupil living in that LLSOA would be able to 
attend the school. It is worth re-emphasising that these are all approximations, and 
there will be cases where this criterion will not hold.  
School performance level: We look separately at both gross output measures and 
value added measures. For the former analyses we use the school’s percentage of 
students achieving at least 5 GCSE grades at C or above, including English and 
Maths, abbreviated to %5A*C(EM), for secondary schools, and the school average 
key stage 2 score, KS2, for primary schools. For the separate value-added analyses 
we use DfE’s standard contextualised value-added score, CVA. We define “good 
schools” in local terms: having a higher mean outcome than the mean of the schools 
within a 3km radius of that school.  
Spare places: While there is some information on the total capacity of the school, 
there is no reliable data for individual year groups, and in particular the entry year 
group (Reception, Year 1 and Year 7).  
We create a minimum spare capacity measure which uses the difference (if 
negative) in [year group] pupil numbers between the current year (in this case 2009) 
and the previous year (2008): spare capacity = max((N(2008) – N(2009)), 0). Whilst 
this measure is by no means perfect, it provides us with a lower bound of spare 
capacity. Again, all we can do here is make an approximation, and it is easy to think 
of cases where it will give the wrong answer. For example, a school that is way 
below capacity but grows slightly will still have spare places in reality, but will be 
missed by this approximation.  Given the lack of data available to us, it is important 
to be clear that there is really no way of estimating how much this might mis-estimate 
true constraints on choices.  
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Given this, we define primary schools as having spare capacity if there are at least 4 
spare places, and secondary schools as having spare capacity if there are at least 
10 spare places. For robustness, we check all our results using assumptions of 1, 2, 
4, and 10 spare places. Of course, in some areas middle schools muddy this picture. 
There are no obvious quality measures available for such schools, so our only option 
was to remove these from the analysis (and the hypothetical reassignment 
simulations reported below do not include middle school pupils).  
We tested the sensitivity of our results to the key assumptions here. First, on using 
the LLSOAs to identify catchment areas, two issues were highlighted. One potential 
problem is that all of the pupils in a particular LLSOA could possibly attend a single 
school, while still being potentially in the catchment area of another school. While 
this is clearly a possibility, in fact it is the case in less than 5% of LLSOAs that all the 
pupils living there attend the same school. Second, we chose 2 as the minimum 
number of pupils living in an area and attending a school as the threshold to identify 
that LLSOA as being in the catchment area of that school. This is clearly an arbitrary 
choice and other numbers would also be legitimate. The tables in Annex 1 show that 
different choices shift the figures in the obvious directions.  
Looking first at primary schools: if we define a school as available if at least 1 
student from that LLSOA attends the school then we find that 18,816 LLSOAs out of 
31,865 we have data for have at least 5 schools available. This is the number in the 
first column penultimate row in the table below. If we require that at least 3 students 
have attended a school for it to count, then the number of LLSOAs with at least five 
schools falls to 408.  
This is not at all surprising: LLSOAs are very small spatial units.  We took as our 
measure that at least 2 students had to attend a school for it to count as available, as 
a reasonable compromise of these two factors. 
We also looked at the sensitivity of our results to the definition of a “good” school.  If 
we define a better school as “A good school with an available place and at least 20% 
of a standard deviation improvement2 on the current school” then the results do not 
differ much. As we would expect there are fewer schools and students with these 
characteristics once we require a greater gap between the performance of the 
current school and the ‘target’ school.  For example, in secondary schools the 
numbers in the final column of Table 1 (see Tables and figures) would be 6.4% 
(instead of 8.7%), 8.4% (13.8%), 9.7% (12.9%), and 10.8% (18.6%).  
 
                                            
2
 These numbers are: 2.82pp KS2 scores, 3.5pp KS4 scores, 0.2 pri CVA, and 4 sec CVA. 
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c. Data 
We use the National Pupil Database (NPD). This analysis uses pupil-level cross 
sections from 2008 and 2009.  Our dataset includes standard personal 
characteristics, including gender, ethnicity, poverty status, full test histories, and 
school attended. Crucially we have pupils’ home postcodes allowing us to better map 
the pupils’ catchment areas. Some information is missing for some pupils, but in all 
cases we use the maximal dataset possible. We include the following school types: 
community, foundation, voluntary aided and voluntary controlled, and academies (for 
secondary schools). Grammar schools that are part of these groups are included. 
Special schools have been excluded. Because of difficulties matching infant to junior 
schools, we only consider all-through primary schools. 
 
d. LA sample selection 
We attempt to quantify the importance of the results by simulating a hypothetical re-
assignment of students between schools. This only makes sense within a relatively 
restricted and closed system, so we do this for all the students and school places 
within an LA; and then repeat for a number of LAs.  
We pick a set of LAs using the following criteria.  
 Less than 10% of schools in the LA are middle schools, as these add 
complications but no new insight; 
 The proportion of schools in the LA with the relevant number of spare places is at 
least 15% (to identify the results of re-assignment, we need some margin to 
actually re-assign some pupils)3; 
 At least 2 of the schools with spare places are “good”, as defined above; 
 For secondary schools, less than 10% of schools in the LA have missing result 
information.  This is not applied to primary school samples as almost all LAs have 
a large selection of infant schools which do not have results.  This largely derives 
from schools switching to academy status, and having no published results in the 
first year; this is also relevant for CVA regressions in areas with middle schools 
 These criteria produce 42 LAs for the main school analysis using the CVA measure; 
this includes 39 (primary school, KS2 measure); 18 (secondary school, CVA) and 10 
(secondary school, GCSE 5A*C). 
                                            
3
 This is also a modelling choice we had to make, though we doubt that varying this would make much 
difference at all to the results.  
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4. Results 1: Identifying pupils with better 
apparently-feasible choices 
 
a. How many students have better apparently-feasible 
choices? 
We start with a straightforward head-count of students satisfying our definition of 
having a higher-performing and apparently feasible choice available. Taking first the 
gross output measure as our definition of performance, Table 1 shows that overall 
this group accounts for about 9% of students: 8.7% in secondary schools and 9.8% 
in primary schools. While this equates to some tens of thousands of students, as a 
fraction of the total it does not seem that large. If we use instead the CVA measure 
of performance the fraction is some 50% higher: 13.8% in secondary schools and 
12.7% in primaries. This makes sense; CVA is not widely used among parents, so 
school choice is less likely to be based on this and consequently more students may 
have a higher CVA school available.  
The table also presents the same data for the sub-set of LAs that we focus on later 
to evaluate the size of the attainment loss. These are by definition places with higher 
numbers of students in this position. The numbers are indeed higher, but not 
dramatically so. 
In Table 2 we identify the LAs with the highest fractions of pupils with higher-
performing available choices. The fractions here are much higher, 23% - 38% for 
secondary schools, and 27% - 33% in primaries. The list of LAs does not suggest 
any obvious pattern – there is a mix of urban and rural, large and small, and varying 
levels of affluence.  
Table 3 presents some simple descriptive statistics comparing the sub-set of LAs 
where there are higher fractions of these students with England as a whole. The 
picture is of little difference, but if anything the sub-set LAs have slightly lower levels 
of deprivation on average. It is not clear whether there are deeper-lying common 
factors among these LAs or this selection derives largely from random noise due to 
the necessity to approximate parents’ school preferences due to lack of data. Such 
deeper-lying factors might be in the way that school choice is implemented or in the 
local geography and transport infrastructure, but this is only speculation. 
In Table 4, we cut the data another way and look at schools. Focussing on the 
second column of data, we have just over 2700 secondary schools in our data. Of 
these, 378 have at least 10 spare places according to our estimate of capacity. And 
of those, 76 showed higher performance than the local average (as defined above), 
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less than 3% of the original total. Again the numbers are higher using the CVA 
measure of performance and the numbers are also higher for primary schools using 
4 spare places as a criterion.  
In summary, it is possible to identify students who are in particular schools despite 
there being higher-performing schools, apparently with places available. In terms of 
numbers there are tens of thousands of such pupils, but as a fraction of the total, 
they account for around 9%. Turning the question around, about 3% of secondary 
schools appear to have places available despite performing better than their local 
competitors. It is worth re-emphasising two things when interpreting these numbers. 
First, data problems: we have no data on parents’ chosen schools so can only infer 
their preferences from their local context; and we have no data on true school 
capacity and so again have to rely on assumptions to estimate capacity. Second, 
there are obviously other factors involved in parents’ choices of school and the fact 
that some are apparently not choosing the highest performing may simply be 
reflecting that those other factors are important too.  
 
b. Describing the pupils with better and feasible choices 
The individual level data in the NPD allows us to characterise the students with 
better and apparently feasible choices available. Table 5 simply provides average 
characteristics, before we report the results of a multivariate regression analysis 
below. Focussing again on the gross output measure of performance, it is clear that 
our focus students are less well-off and show lower prior attainment, reflecting the 
findings in the literature review above. For example, for secondary schools, 16.2% of 
FSM-eligible students fall under our definition compared to 8.8% of non-eligible 
students (these are unconditional figures; the tables control for other factors 
correlated with FSM eligibility such as IDACI, ethnicity and SEN).  
We now undertake a more formal analysis4. Exploiting the individual data in the 
NPD, we run a linear probability model to quantify the individual factors associated 
with having better and apparently feasible choices available. The independent 
variable is a dummy indicating if the pupils have a better school available in their 
catchment area, which has spare capacity at the relevant level. We have defined 
these spare capacity levels to be four and ten for primary and secondary schools 
respectively. The regressions are run on all pupils in the relevant year groups of the 
LAs selected for each model, but where school result information is unavailable all 
pupils from that school are omitted. As explanatory variables we include: gender, 
ethnicity, FSM-status, IDACI, EAL-status, SEN-status, prior attainment (for year 7 
                                            
4
 These are OLS regressions on the variables indicated in the Table and footnotes, with fixed effects 
at the level of the LA, and standard errors clustered at LA level.  
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pupils), and LA fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at LA level in all 
regressions. In Table 6 we look at students entering primary school and in Table 7 
those just entering secondary school. For each, we offer four variants: 
 Gross output measure (GCSE or KS2), all students in England 
 Gross output measure (GCSE or KS2), students in selected LAs 
 CVA measure, all students in England 
 CVA measure, students in selected LAs 
There are a number of common patterns across all four panels of Table 6. Both 
individual (FSM) and neighbourhood (IDACI) deprivation are highly correlated with 
the availability of places in higher-performing schools. In Table 6A, the magnitude of 
the IDACI coefficient suggests that a 10 percentage point (ppt) increase in the IDACI 
score (about half a standard deviation) is associated with a 1.4 ppt increase in the 
probability of having a better school available. Relative to an overall probability for 
the dependent variable of around 9%, this is a very high impact. The coefficient on 
FSM is also very substantial, implying that FSM-eligible children have a higher 
probability of having a local higher-performing school with available slots of around 3 
ppt, almost 40% higher than FSM non-eligible students.  
In terms of the other characteristics, Asian ethnicity is often but not always negatively 
associated, Black ethnicity varies in sign, and being female is usually negatively 
associated with the availability of places in higher-performing schools. SEN-status is 
typically positively linked and EAL-status varies in sign and significance.  
It is clear that the inclusion in the regression of the IDACI measure results in a lower 
coefficient on the FSM measure. In some cases, panels C and D, this pushes FSM 
into insignificance. It is unclear whether this is simply due to the very high statistical 
correlation between individual and neighbourhood deprivation, or whether it is really 
due to the latter being more important than the former. The fact that the 
insignificance arises in much smaller (though not small) samples suggest that it may 
simply be a multicollinearity issue.  
There is a very similar pattern in Table 7 for secondary schools. Again, individual 
and neighbourhood deprivation are strongly associated with the dependent variable. 
The proportional increase in the probability of the availability of places in higher-
performing schools for FSM-eligible students is high: for example, in Panel A, 
column 6, it is 3.3 ppt higher, relative to an overall probability of 10% in this sample. 
The impact of IDACI is also somewhat higher in secondary schools.  
In general, the magnitudes of the coefficients are bigger in the secondary school 
regressions for both IDACI and FSM-status, implying that disadvantaged families are 
more likely to have ignored available places in higher-performing schools at the 
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secondary level relative to primary. This may simply be due to the greater number of 
primary schools relative to secondary schools. Alternatively, it could be that primary 
schools are seen as more homogenous than secondary schools and as such parents 
are less concerned about quality measures.  
The role of prior attainment (KS2 score) fits in with this. Low prior attainment is 
associated with a higher probability of the availability of places in higher-performing 
schools. Given that admissions cannot be directly related to KS2 scores and should 
generally be independent of ability altogether, it seems likely that the KS2 
coefficients are mainly picking up differences in parental background.  
The role of the other individual characteristics follows the same pattern as in primary 
schools. Asian ethnicity is often associated negatively with the dependent variable, 
as is being female; Black ethnicity has either no effect or a positive effect. EAL status 
is usually insignificant and SEN status typically positive.  
It should be noted that as is typical in this sort of dataset, the fraction of the variation 
explained in the model, the R2, is low.  
In summary, while the overall percentage of students with a local higher-performing 
school with available slots is relatively low at around 9%, it is much higher for 
disadvantaged students. Students who are FSM-eligible and live in deprived 
neighbourhoods are more likely to be identified as not attending an available higher-
performing school; Asian students less likely and Black students more likely to meet 
this definition.  
5. Results 2: Implications of these choices 
 
In this section we examine the implications of the choices we analysed above. To do 
this, we consider a hypothetical situation in which we attribute different school 
choices to the students we have identified above as being in a particular school 
despite there apparently being places available at higher-performing schools. We 
then mimic the operation of the school admissions algorithm and assign the students 
to schools. Obviously, with different preferences, the school assignments are 
different, and in principle so are the test scores.  
We evaluate the impact on student attainment from these hypothetical 
reassignments. The details of the algorithm by which we carry out this process are 
set out below. Again, clearly a number of assumptions are made to do this, and the 
results are as ever only as strong as the assumptions. We believe that the results 
are interesting, but are clearly taking our data a long way, and need to be interpreted 
very cautiously.  
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a. Modelling Decisions 
There are two key empirical decisions we have to make: which students would go to 
which schools? And what GCSE score would they get there?5 We do this in a way 
that tries to respect most of the real world features that govern school allocation. The 
algorithm respects school size: we don’t ‘magically’ create more spaces at the good 
schools. It uses the actual admissions mechanism that is in operation across the 
country (that is, an ‘equal preferences’ mechanism). And we take account of the key 
role of proximity in school admissions – we include in each student’s choice set only 
those schools to which that student’s neighbours have gained admission. 
We rely on the simpler procedure considered by Allen and Burgess (2011) to 
estimate the counter-factual score that a student would get in a school other than the 
one actually attended. We do not take any account of other things that might change 
consequent upon a changed student demographic composition – the role of peer 
effects, and indirect peer effects through teacher and other resource changes. 
The data design is as follows: 
1. We generate an individual catchment zone for each student. This is derived 
as follows: they are generated based on their LLSOA having at least 2 pupils 
attend a given school; in addition their own actually-attended school is in their 
personal catchment zone. 
2. A school is considered “good” if it scores at least as high as the mean 
performance score in the catchment area of the LLSOA. As above, we use 
different performance metrics: the school percentage scoring at least 5 A*-C 
(EM), the school mean KS2 score and CVA. 
3. The dataset is shaped so that all schools in the catchment area and the 
student’s own school are in the dataset. 
4. The admissions algorithm works with pupil preferences for schools and school 
priorities for pupils. We do not have these in the data, so we need to generate 
them.  
5. Pupil preferences are randomly generated (using a uniform distribution) for all 
good schools and given values between 1 (highest preference) and just above 
zero. Preferences for non-good schools are set to zero.  
                                            
5
 We decided to model the GCSE points score rather than the likelihood of getting at least 5A*-C 
grades as modelling the continuous variable (point score) gives more information than a dichotomous 
variable. 
 38 
 
6. Pupil priorities are also randomly generated for within-catchment area pupils. 
This is then over-written and set to 1 for the actually-attended school, so 
anyone in a good school can always go there if they wish.  
Admissions Algorithm 
1. Nominations are based on pupil preferences 
a. Pupils’ nominated schools are accepted according to pupil priorities 
b. Pupils who attended a good school already always reapply 
2. Once pupils are accepted to a good school, they always reapply to it unless 
displaced in which case they apply to their next highest preference 
3. The algorithm continues until a stable matching is found. 
This procedure is carried out simultaneously for all catchment areas across the 
entire LA. Students living near the borders of an LA are allowed to apply to schools 
in neighbouring LAs. A separate randomisation and reassignment is carried out for 
each specification (ie: primary CVA; primary KS2). The entire procedure is repeated 
for each LA in the sub-set determined above. 
To predict the test score that a student would get at another school we estimate pupil 
level fixed effect regressions on GCSE point scores. We adopt a very standard 
model: we regress GCSE points score on pupil characteristics and school fixed 
effects for year 11 pupils for the years 2006 – 2009.  We extract the estimated 
school effect for each school. We use the estimated coefficients on pupil 
characteristics along with the school effects to form a predicted outcome for each 
pupil in both the assigned and the attended school. 
 
b. Results  
It is worth re-emphasising that in interpreting the results, these are thought 
experiments based on a number of strong assumptions; they are not predictions. As 
we have noted, they are unlikely to represent a new steady state and many other 
things are likely to change too. We believe that they do indicate a broad order of 
magnitude of the likely impact of different preferences. We have indicated the 
sensitivity of the results to the key modelling assumptions above.  
In Table 8 we give a simple overview of the re-assignments for secondary school 
(panel A) and primary (panel B), categorising by quintile of school performance. The 
top part of panel A shows the results of using gross output, the %5A*-C(EM), as the 
performance measure for the reassignment. Of the identified students attending 
schools in the lowest quintile, a small number are re-assigned to better schools 
within that quintile. A lot more are reassigned to schools in the second or third 
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quintile, and some higher. Schools of considerably different academic performance 
can be found quite close together so it is possible that large gains in attainment can 
be recorded.  
In the lower part of Panel A, we use CVA as the performance measure for 
reassignment. As we showed earlier, this identifies a lot more students apparently in 
lower-performing schools, because CVA is not widely used (or known) for forming 
preferences. This therefore leads to a lot more re-assignments too. It also leads to 
some apparent losses – students being re-assigned to lower performing quintiles as 
defined by the %5A* - C(EM), because this and CVA are not perfectly correlated. 
Turning to primary schools in Panel B, we see a similar pattern. The most common 
reassignment is one or two quintiles higher – so a substantive gain.  
We consider this in much more detail in Table 9. As before, this has four panels: 
secondary and primary schools, gross output and CVA measures of performance. 
Panel A relates to secondary schools, with re-assignments using %5A*-C(EM) as the 
performance measure. As noted above, the procedure was run separately for each 
LA; the results are presented here ranked by LA average score gain for all the LAs in 
our sub-set.  
The table shows some LAs with sizeable gains: 19.4 points in Surrey is a gain of 6% 
of the starting value; 8.5 points for Durham is 3%. These are gains of 19.2% and 
8.3% of a pupil-level standard deviation (SD) of GCSE points score, so not trivial. An 
alternative metric is grades: 6 points is a difference of one grade in one GCSE, so 
19.4 points means one grade higher in 3 – 4 GCSEs. These gains will go 
disproportionately to FSM-eligible students (as they are more likely to be re-
assigned) so this will reduce the attainment gap to a degree. This is illustrated below 
in Figure 1. In the second panel, there are more reassignments using the CVA basis 
(as we have seen above), and the range of gains is comparable to the first.  
The third and fourth panels of the table focus on primary schools. More LAs fit the 
criteria for inclusion in the analysis, and the gains are more substantial. The scores 
are presented as normalised KS2 scores so are in SD units. There are a number of 
LAs with mean gains over 20% of an SD. 
 In Figure 1 we provide a graphical representation of these results. Again, the 
different panels relate to different cases. Panels A – D are secondary schools, and E 
– F for primaries; A and B report the results of using %5A*-C(EM) as the 
reassignment performance measure for two different outcomes plotted, GCSE 
grades (A) and GCSE points (B); C and D plot the same outcome measures using 
CVA as the reassignment performance measure. Panels E and F plot normalised 
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KS2 scores using first KS2 and then CVA as the reassignment performance 
measure. 
Each figure is constructed as follows from the individual student-level predicted 
gains. We took the GCSE gains and ranked students from the lowest to the biggest 
gains (negative (ie losses) at the lower end, and substantially positive at the top). 
This is the horizontal axis, the lowest ranked student at x=1 at the left and the 
student with the highest gain at the right. The line then simply plots the gain for each 
student.  
There are a few common patterns in all the panels. The gradient for FSM-eligible 
pupils appears to be steeper indicating bigger gains for these pupils. At the upper 
end of the rankings they appear to mirror each other, with a few pupils in both groups 
making very large gains.  
Focussing on panel C, the FSM group passes the zero gain point at the 300th pupil 
(out of 1101 obs); the top 50% gain at least 2 grades and the top 25% gain at least 4 
grades. The non-FSM group passes the zero gain point at the 2936th pupil (out of 
9583) with the top 50% gaining at least 1.4 grades and the top 25% gaining at least 
3.8. Overall, the mean gain for FSM-eligible students is 2 grades, and the mean gain 
for non-FSM students is 1.6 grades. This supports the claim that this hypothetical 
reassignment strategy decreases the attainment gap. A very similar pattern is seen 
in the panels for primary school students.  Again the line for FSM-eligible students is 
steeper, and the majority of students see a positive change. For FSM-eligible 
students, about half receive estimated gains of over 0.25 standard deviations of a 
normalised KS2 score, and not small numbers receive gains over 0.75 SDs.  
Turning attention to the impact on schools as opposed to individual students, one 
goal of this analysis was to quantify the impact of these identified choices on the 
admissions of under-performing schools; that is, to see if these identified choices 
were an important part of helping these low-performing schools survive. But this is 
actually very difficult to isolate. Our hypothetical reassignment respected existing 
school sizes, so not all students who wanted to could gain a place at a high-
performing school as we did not allow those schools to expand. Consequently, those 
students had to be found a place somewhere and using the Equal Preferences 
algorithm, some students had to be placed in the low-performing schools. In other 
words, the scope for pupil numbers to fall at low performing schools is limited by the 
scope for numbers at other schools to rise.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
a. Summary of Evidence Review 
 
The evidence suggests that what parents look for in a school may vary by social 
class: middle classes tend to value performance and peer group; lower SES groups 
may look for accessibility, friendliness of staff and support for those of lower ability. 
This may lead lower SES groups to select themselves out of high performing schools 
to avoid possible rejection or failure.  
Disadvantaged families (by definition) have access to less in the way of resources, 
which may limit the range of schools which they can consider due to transport costs. 
More affluent families tend to have access to higher quality information on schools 
and be more adept at using it. The publication of performance tables and Ofsted 
reports aims to level the playing field in this regard, but cannot generate informal 
knowledge of local schools. 
 
b. Summary of our Data Analysis 
 
This report explores the choices made by parents in relation to school performance.  
Our focus is on the potential for more children from disadvantaged families to attend 
high-performing schools. We estimate the choices made by families relative to our 
estimate of their feasible choice sets. Specifically, we consider how many students 
could potentially have attended a higher performing school with spaces available.  
We use the NPD to address the following question for each student: “does this 
student have a local school with spare places which also has higher performance 
level than the current school?” We define all these terms in detail. Breaking this 
overall question down into simple, specific, quantitative questions based on a 
number of necessary modelling assumptions  allows us to: 
 quantify how many students appear to be in this category, and how many schools 
are high-performing but not full; 
 identify the typical characteristics of the students we identify; 
 carry out a counter-factual analysis: we hypothetically re-assign students to 
different schools in a way that takes more account of school performance and 
quantify the gain in mean attainment.  
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Lack of data forces us to make a number of strong modelling assumptions. Based on 
these, we are able to establish the broad order of magnitude of the number of 
students who are in particular schools despite there being local higher-performing 
schools, apparently with places available.  We believe that between 5% and 10% of 
secondary school students fall into this category. Turning the question around, about 
3% of secondary schools appear to have places available despite performing better 
than their local competitors. We reiterate that these numbers are estimates, based 
on a set of strong assumptions, because there is no data available on the actual 
choices parents make, and only poor data on school capacity. 
 
While the average percentage of such students in secondary schools is around 9%, 
it is higher for disadvantaged students. Students who are FSM-eligible and live in 
deprived neighbourhoods are much more likely to be attending a school despite 
there being a local higher-performing school apparently with spare places. Asian 
students are less likely to meet this definition and Black students more likely.  
Having identified such students, the second question is how much difference would it 
make to hypothetically re-assign them to other schools. Needless to say, this 
necessarily involves more modelling assumptions. In order to keep a degree of 
realism, we respect the apparent capacities of schools and do not assign students to 
schools beyond the numbers that they currently take. This is therefore necessarily 
strongly dependent on our assumptions on capacity.   
We simulate such an assignment many times and average over the outcomes to 
evaluate the likely impact on attainment if these parents had chosen different 
schools. This relies on our estimates of the impact of schools on pupil attainment, 
which derive from fixed effect regressions and which we cannot consider to be truly 
causal. Bearing all these caveats in mind, our results show non-trivial gains for some 
groups in some places: there are some LAs with average gains of between 10% and 
20% of a pupil-level standard deviation of GCSE points score, a substantial number.  
Once we split the gains up by FSM-status, we see stronger gains on average for 
FSM-eligible students. Overall, the mean gain for FSM-eligible students is around 2 
GCSE grades per student, and the mean gain for non-FSM students is 1.6 grades. 
This supports the claim that this hypothetical reassignment strategy decreases the 
socio-economic attainment gap.  
 
c. Proposals  
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Can we say that (somehow) encouraging disadvantaged families to place greater 
weight on school performance when making school choices would be likely to 
increase overall attainment, and reduce the attainment gap?  
Certainly not on the basis of this study alone. It is not at all clear that disadvantaged 
families have very different school choice preferences from more affluent families. 
This study has much more modest ambitions: to produce an estimate of the orders of 
magnitude involved and a general sense of the potential gain in test scores.  It is 
worth re-emphasising two limitations when interpreting these numbers. First, data 
problems: we have no data on parents’ chosen schools so can only infer their 
preferences from their local context; and we have no data on true school capacity 
and so again have to rely on assumptions to estimate capacity. Second, there are 
obviously other factors involved in parents’ choices of school and the fact that some 
are apparently not choosing the highest performing may simply be reflecting that 
those other factors are important too.  
Our literature review makes clear that for some families resource constraints may 
limit choices, while for others, better/more suitable information may influence their 
choices.  For these families relevant support may make a significant difference. But it 
also suggests that some families value schools for reasons other than performance, 
and some may even deliberately select themselves out of high-performing schools to 
avoid failure. Policy intervention here is both practically and morally complex.  
Finally, we re-state our view that while this group of students (attending a low-
performing school because they chose it) is certainly of interest, another group 
(attending a low performing school because they could not get in to a higher-
performing one) is more numerous and plays a greater role in explaining the 
attainment gap, and that the proximity rule for school admissions is a big part of that 
(Burgess et al., 2009). 
Throughout this report we have emphasized the strong assumptions we have had to 
make to characterize this phenomenon. This problem arises from lack of data on 
parental preferences and school capacity. Such data could be obtained (indeed our 
original proposal was to do so), and we would recommend doing so if there is a 
desire to follow this study up in any way. Given the approximations required to 
produce the numbers we have, we believe it would be foolhardy to base any policy 
proposals solely on these. 
If it were then shown to be the case that significant numbers of parents were making 
decisions for their children to attend schools other than the highest performing, then 
it might be appropriate to consider some of the policies discussed in the Evidence 
Review section. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 Students attending a school despite the local presence of a higher performing school 
with spare capacity 
Secondary schools 
 Total number of 
pupils 
With a higher performing 
school available with spare 
capacity 
  Number  % 
England 
School performance 
measure: 
   
%5A*-C(EM)  505,917 44,025 8.70 
CVA 505,917 69,984 13.83 
Subsample  
%5A*-C(EM)  68,683 8,725 12.89 
CVA 119,9951 22,310 18.59 
    
Primary schools 
England 
Mean KS2 score  813,320 79,942 9.83 
CVA 567,192 72,287 12.74 
Subsample  
Mean KS2 score  317,216 35,588 11.22 
CVA 225,1182 36,116 16.04 
Note: capacity is taken to be at least 10 spare places at secondary and 4 at primary school. 
1. These two numbers (68,683 and 119,995) are different because we use different samples due to the fact 
different LAs have different levels of missingness across the 2 specification (results information). Also more LAs 
met the criteria of “at least 2 good schools with spare capacity” we used when choosing our LAs. 
2. The CVA subsample had around 100,000 observations with no CVA information. 
3. Totals differ between this and table 3 as there is different information required. Table 3 has cases where we 
have no results information for the individual. 
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Table 2 Local Authorities with highest fractions of such students 
Local Authority  Percentage with a higher 
performing school 
available with spare 
capacity 
Secondary Schools   
Stockton-on-Tees 38.5 
North Lincolnshire 30.8 
Wirral 27.2 
Durham 25.0 
Wakefield 23.5 
Primary Schools   
Liverpool 32.8 
Dudley 29.6 
Cornwall 28.4 
North Yorkshire 28.0 
York 26.8 
Note: capacity is taken to be at least 10 spare places at secondary and 4 at primary school. 
Performance measure used in %5A*-C(EM) and KS2 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics for key variables 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 Primary Schools Secondary Schools 
 England Analysis sub-
samples 
England Analysis sub-
samples 
  CVA 
Sample 
KS2  
Sample 
 CVA 
Sample 
% 5A*-
C(EM) 
Sample 
% Eligible for 
Free School 
Meals 
17.6 
(38.1) 
13.8 
(34.5) 
14.7 
(35.4) 
16.8 
(37.4) 
11.8 
(32.2) 
13.5 
(34.1) 
 
Mean IDACI 
score 
25.4 
(19.8) 
20.1 
(17.3) 
21.2 
(21.2) 
23.3 
(18.7) 
17.3 
(14.3) 
19.0 
(16.2) 
 
Bottom Quartile 
of KS2  
- - - 26.0 
(43.9) 
25.0 
(43.3) 
25.4 
(43.5) 
 
Top Quartile of 
KS2 
- - - 23.6 
(42.5) 
25.1 
(43.4) 
24.1 
(42.8) 
 
N 756,998 222,661 277,227 511,062 119,966 67,679 
1. Totals differ between this and table 1 as there is different information required. Table 3 has cases where we 
have no results information for the individual. 
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Table 4 Schools, spare capacity and performance 
 Year 1 Year 7 
Performance measure is KS score KS2 KS4 
Schools with this year group 12222 2767 
 And above local KS 5871 971 
 
No.  with at least 1 spare place 3646 1014 
 And above local KS 1647 322 
 
No. With at least 4 spare places 1769 648 
 And above local KS 725 163 
No. With at least 10 spare places 403 378 
 And above local KS 167 76 
Performance measure is CVA    
Schools with this year group 9186 2768 
 And above local CVA  4692 1452 
 
No.  with at least 1 spare place 2755 1014 
 And above local CVA 1407 512 
 
No. With at least 4 spare places 1317 648 
 And above local CVA 639 307 
 
No. With at least 10 spare places 291 378 
 And above local CVA 141 161 
Local average means the average of schools in a 3km radius of the school. 
KS2 Performance is the percentage achieving level 4 
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Table 5 Characteristics of pupils not attending best local schoolPercentage of pupils not 
attending the best local school when it has 10+ places available: (Primary schools only require 
4+ places) 
 Year 1 / R Year 7 
Performance 
measure: 
FSM Eligible?  FSM eligible?  KS2 Group  
 No  Yes  No  Yes  Low  Mid  Top  
KS2/GCSE Score 11.0 16.1 11.5 22.0 15.7 13.0 9.5 
CVA 15.6 19.1 17.7 25.1 19.8 18.7 17.0 
All pupils in the regression subsamples are in the table. 
This includes pupils who attend a ‘good’ school but have a better one with 10(4 for 
primary) spaces available.
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Table 6 Panels A-D: Student characteristics associated with having a better primary school choice available: Panel A: All LAs, Performance 
measure is KS2 
Outcome is binary, is there a better school with space in my catchment;  
all LAs; 
spare places = 4+;  
performance measure = KS2 
 
 Reception:   Yr1:   Pooled   Reception Yr1:  Pooled  
FSM 
eligible 
0.0126*** 0.0130*** 0.0128*** 0.0281*** 0.0296*** 0.0289*** 
 (0.00214) (0.00206) (0.00159) (0.00331) (0.00339) (0.00235) 
IDACI 
score 
0.127*** 0.141*** 0.134***    
 (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0113)    
Asian 
ethnicity 
0.00917 -0.00884 -0.000779 0.0149** -0.00164 0.00564 
 (0.00617) (0.00546) (0.00440) (0.00691) (0.00538) (0.00476) 
Black 
ethnicity 
0.00219 -0.000180 0.00110 0.0127** 0.0119** 0.0124*** 
 (0.00566) (0.00568) (0.00459) (0.00562) (0.00543) (0.00440) 
Female -0.00234** -0.000117 -0.00106 -0.00193* 0.000429 -0.000595 
 (0.00101) (0.000939) (0.000716) (0.00101) (0.000938) (0.000711) 
EAL 0.00119 0.00303 0.00215 0.00773** 0.0105*** 0.00926*** 
 (0.00347) (0.00326) (0.00275) (0.00384) (0.00352) (0.00304) 
SEN 0.00989*** 0.00937*** 0.0104*** 0.0151*** 0.0147*** 0.0154*** 
 (0.00266) (0.00226) (0.00188) (0.00282) (0.00259) (0.00202) 
N 356531 417914 774445 357972 419784 777756 
R2 0.040 0.040 0.031 0.036 0.035 0.026 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
All regressions contain LA level fixed effects 
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Table 6 Panels A-D: Student characteristics associated with having a better primary school choice available: Panel B: Select LAs, Performance 
measure is KS2 
Outcome is binary, is there a better school with space in my catchment  
Select LAS 
Spare places = 4+  
Performance measure = KS2 
 
 Reception:   Yr1:   Pooled   Reception  Yr1:  Pooled  
FSM 
eligible 
0.0227*** 0.0132*** 0.0176*** 0.0423*** 0.0308*** 0.0361*** 
 (0.00401) (0.00408) (0.00306) (0.00545) (0.00746) (0.00435) 
IDACI 
score 
0.142*** 0.133*** 0.138***    
 (0.0226) (0.0369) (0.0197)    
Asian 
ethnicity 
-0.0153 -0.00784 -0.0102 -0.0115 -0.00436 -0.00661 
 (0.0153) (0.0193) (0.0132) (0.0159) (0.0201) (0.0142) 
Black 
ethnicity 
-0.00640 -0.0219*** -0.0136** -0.000862 -0.0170** -0.00847 
 (0.0120) (0.00690) (0.00656) (0.0117) (0.00801) (0.00705) 
Female -0.0192** 0.00571 -0.00603 -0.00430 0.0191* 0.00807 
 -0.00148 -0.00168 -0.00160 -0.00106 -0.00115 -0.00113 
EAL (0.00199) (0.00176) (0.00135) (0.00199) (0.00176) (0.00135) 
 0.00795 0.0153** 0.0110* 0.0171* 0.0240*** 0.0200*** 
SEN (0.00922) (0.00625) (0.00594) (0.00951) (0.00748) (0.00655) 
N 133211 156453 289664 133699 157103 290802 
R2 0.029 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.020 0.018 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
All regressions contain LA level fixed effects 
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Table 6 Panels A-D: Student characteristics associated with having a better primary school choice available: Panel C: All LAs, Performance 
measure is CVA 
 
Outcome is binary, is there a better school with space in my catchment  
All LAS 
Spare places = 4+  
Performance measure = CVA 
 
  Reception Yr1:  Pooled  Reception Yr1:  Pooled  
FSM 
eligible 
0.00374** -0.000116 0.00186 0.0130*** 0.0113*** 0.0123*** 
 (0.00186) (0.00172) (0.00137) (0.00326) (0.00317) (0.00257) 
IDACI 
score 
0.0759*** 0.0962*** 0.0866***    
 (0.0184) (0.0194) (0.0149)    
Asian 
ethnicity 
-0.00292 0.00205 -0.0000436 0.000545 0.00692 0.00409 
 (0.00611) (0.00516) (0.00468) (0.00594) (0.00513) (0.00459) 
Black 
ethnicity 
0.00807 0.00989* 0.00903* 0.0143** 0.0179*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.00578) (0.00569) (0.00470) (0.00596) (0.00574) (0.00471) 
Female 0.00125 0.00137 0.00139* 0.00148* 0.00170* 0.00165** 
 (0.000867) (0.000978) (0.000742) (0.000875) (0.00101) (0.000763) 
EAL -0.00435 0.0000730 -0.00197 -0.000415 0.00523* 0.00264 
 (0.00347) (0.00285) (0.00248) (0.00353) (0.00292) (0.00247) 
SEN 0.000641 0.00114 0.00123 0.00374 0.00470** 0.00444** 
 (0.00213) (0.00206) (0.00189) (0.00226) (0.00235) (0.00210) 
N 356531 417914 774445 357972 419784 777756 
R2 0.044 0.036 0.031 0.042 0.033 0.028 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  All regressions contain LA level fixed effects 
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Table 6 Panels A-D: Student characteristics associated with having a better primary school choice available: Panel D: Select LAs, Performance 
measure is CVA 
Outcome is binary, is there a better school with space in my catchment  
Select LAS 
Spare places = 4+  
Performance measure = CVA 
 
 Reception   Yr1:  Pooled  Reception Yr1:  Pooled  
FSM 
eligible 
0.00409 -0.00101 0.00119 0.0170** 0.0110 0.0138** 
 (0.00324) (0.00327) (0.00265) (0.00661) (0.00753) (0.00571) 
IDACI 
score 
0.0929** 0.0892** 0.0921***    
 (0.0372) (0.0407) (0.0301)    
Asian 
ethnicity 
-0.00382 0.00268 -0.000216 -0.000469 0.00559 0.00293 
 (0.0110) (0.0108) (0.00847) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.00871) 
Black 
ethnicity 
-0.0284*** 0.00623 -0.0115 -0.0186** 0.0147 -0.00219 
 (0.00994) (0.0104) (0.00765) (0.00911) (0.00926) (0.00645) 
Female 0.00131 0.000936 0.00100 0.00158 0.00119 0.00126 
 (0.00135) (0.00194) (0.00146) (0.00140) (0.00205) (0.00154) 
EAL -0.0141* 0.00169 -0.00598 -0.00838 0.00743 -0.000156 
 (0.00799) (0.00681) (0.00563) (0.00789) (0.00723) (0.00549) 
SEN -0.00191 0.00556 0.00104 0.00205 0.00890* 0.00455 
 (0.00333) (0.00375) (0.00369) (0.00340) (0.00466) (0.00429) 
N 136804 161268 298072 137289 161927 299216 
R2 0.034 0.020 0.022 0.032 0.019 0.020 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; All regressions contain LA level fixed effects; *Main difference is Black indicator 
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Table 7 Panels A-D: Student characteristics associated with having a better secondary school choice available: Panel A: All LAs, Performance 
measure is %5A* - C(EM) 
Outcome is binary, is there a better school with space in my catchment; All LAs; Spare places = 2+, 4+, 10+;  
Performance measure = %5A* - C(EM) 
 
 2 Spare 4 Spare 10 Spare 2 Spare 4 Spare 10 Spare 
FSM 
Eligible 
0.0275*** 0.0233*** 0.0158*** 0.0455*** 0.0440*** 0.0326*** 
 (0.00324) (0.00274) (0.00236) (0.00497) (0.00404) (0.00372) 
IDACI 
score 
0.165*** 0.188*** 0.153***    
 (0.0299) (0.0214) (0.0184)    
Low KS2 
score 
0.0184*** 0.0154*** 0.0109*** 0.0226*** 0.0202*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.00292) (0.00254) (0.00174) (0.00310) (0.00271) (0.00193) 
High KS2 
score 
-0.0463*** -0.0313*** -0.0186*** -0.0518*** -0.0376*** -0.0236*** 
 (0.00724) (0.00594) (0.00443) (0.00714) (0.00593) (0.00446) 
SEN 0.0102*** 0.00786*** 0.00459** 0.0126*** 0.0107*** 0.00685*** 
 (0.00316) (0.00258) (0.00199) (0.00329) (0.00269) (0.00208) 
Female -0.0125*** -0.00894*** -0.00482*** -0.0119*** -0.00829*** -0.00422** 
 (0.00284) (0.00236) (0.00179) (0.00285) (0.00235) (0.00179) 
EAL 0.00788 0.00308 0.000791 0.0149* 0.0111* 0.00718 
 (0.00837) (0.00667) (0.00488) (0.00819) (0.00646) (0.00466) 
Asian -0.0249*** -0.0217** -0.0184*** -0.0175* -0.0134 -0.0116* 
 (0.00954) (0.00873) (0.00695) (0.00999) (0.00904) (0.00677) 
Black -0.000560 0.00331 -0.00746 0.0128 0.0183** 0.00475 
 (0.00842) (0.00817) (0.00596) (0.00884) (0.00856) (0.00598) 
N 491550 491550 491550 492761 492761 492761 
R2 0.088 0.087 0.092 0.085 0.081 0.085 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
All regressions contain LA level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LA level 
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Table 7 Panels A-D: Student characteristics associated with having a better secondary school choice available: Panel B: Select LAs, Performance 
measure is %5A* - C(EM) 
Outcome is binary, is there a better school with space in my catchment; Select LAs; Spare places = 2+, 4+, 10+;  
Performance measure = %5A* - C(EM) 
 
 2 Spare 4 Spare 10 Spare 2 Spare 4 Spare 10 Spare 
FSM 
Eligible 
0.0352*** 0.0242*** 0.0227** 0.0623*** 0.0564*** 0.0550*** 
 (0.00624) (0.00650) (0.00775) (0.00988) (0.00981) (0.0130) 
IDACI 
score 
0.229*** 0.273*** 0.273***    
 (0.0637) (0.0629) (0.0608)    
Low KS2 
score 
0.0186** 0.0134* 0.00690 0.0248*** 0.0207** 0.0142** 
 (0.00621) (0.00715) (0.00491) (0.00733) (0.00801) (0.00619) 
High KS2 
score 
-0.0472** -0.0310* -0.0225* -0.0544** -0.0396** -0.0311** 
 (0.0169) (0.0140) (0.0112) (0.0169) (0.0143) (0.0122) 
SEN 0.0158 0.0160** 0.0135** 0.0205 0.0217*** 0.0191** 
 (0.0121) (0.00556) (0.00589) (0.0123) (0.00579) (0.00622) 
Female -0.0131** -0.00145 0.000784 -0.0119* -0.0000780 0.00214 
 (0.00563) (0.00378) (0.00411) (0.00586) (0.00343) (0.00388) 
EAL -0.0158 -0.0251 0.0158** -0.00619 -0.0136 0.0278*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0310) (0.00673) (0.0252) (0.0345) (0.00802) 
Asian -0.00200 0.00832 -0.0418 0.0249 0.0403 -0.0100 
 (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0422) (0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0412) 
Black 0.0141 0.0317 0.0155 0.0319 0.0528* 0.0364* 
 (0.0340) (0.0249) (0.0186) (0.0351) (0.0259) (0.0185) 
N 64805 64805 64805 64916 64916 64916 
R2 0.104 0.107 0.131 0.099 0.098 0.118 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; All regressions contain LA level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LA level 
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Table 7 Panels A-D: Student characteristics associated with having a better secondary school choice available:  Panel C: All LAs, Performance 
measure is CVA 
Outcome is binary, is there a better school with space in my catchment; All LAs; Spare places = 2+, 4+, 10+;  
Performance measure = CVA 
 
YR7: Outcome is binary, is there a better school (CVA) in my catchment with N Spare places 
 2 Spare  4 Spare  10 Spare  2 Spare 4 Spare 10 Spare 
FSM 
Eligible 
-0.00994*** -0.00595** -0.00138 0.0129** 0.0184*** 0.0197*** 
 (0.00340) (0.00281) (0.00230) (0.00507) (0.00406) (0.00366) 
IDACI 
score 
0.208*** 0.221*** 0.191***    
 (0.0298) (0.0249) (0.0213)    
Low KS2 
score 
-0.00463* -0.00151 0.00150 0.000814 0.00427* 0.00648*** 
 (0.00269) (0.00233) (0.00194) (0.00277) (0.00239) (0.00204) 
High KS2 
score 
-0.0119*** -0.00824*** -0.00663** -0.0188*** -0.0156*** -0.0130*** 
 (0.00331) (0.00305) (0.00257) (0.00337) (0.00310) (0.00269) 
SEN -0.00329 -0.00205 -0.00393 -0.000387 0.00106 -0.00127 
 (0.00363) (0.00332) (0.00313) (0.00368) (0.00333) (0.00317) 
Female 0.000103 0.000361 0.000446 0.000893 0.00114 0.00111 
 (0.00303) (0.00228) (0.00180) (0.00303) (0.00229) (0.00180) 
EAL -0.00221 -0.00564 -0.00523 0.00658 0.00370 0.00271 
 (0.00768) (0.00650) (0.00542) (0.00758) (0.00632) (0.00517) 
Asian 0.00441 -0.00378 -0.00234 0.0136 0.00600 0.00619 
 (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.00927) (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.00882) 
Black 0.0346*** 0.0273*** 0.0108 0.0514*** 0.0449*** 0.0261*** 
 (0.00808) (0.00860) (0.00756) (0.00845) (0.00887) (0.00754) 
N 491550 491550 491550 492761 492761 492761 
R2 0.080 0.087 0.098 0.076 0.081 0.091 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; All regressions contain LA level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LA level 
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Table 7 Panels A-D: Student characteristics associated with having a better secondary school choice available:  Panel D: Select LAs, Performance 
measure is CVA 
Outcome is binary, is there a better school with space in my catchment; Select LAs; Spare places = 2+, 4+, 10+;  
Performance measure = CVA 
 
 2 Spare  4 Spare  10 Spare  2 Spare 4 Spare 10 Spare 
FSM 
Eligible 
0.00675 0.00851 0.0127* 0.0395*** 0.0457*** 0.0462*** 
 (0.00720) (0.00663) (0.00619) (0.0113) (0.0105) (0.0102) 
IDACI 
score 
0.297*** 0.337*** 0.305***    
 (0.0639) (0.0605) (0.0524)    
Low KS2 
score 
-0.00418 -0.00451 -0.00420 0.00355 0.00429 0.00372 
 (0.00678) (0.00522) (0.00476) (0.00651) (0.00528) (0.00539) 
High KS2 
score 
-0.0111 -0.0110* -0.00946 -0.0197*** -0.0207*** -0.0182** 
 (0.00742) (0.00587) (0.00617) (0.00661) (0.00556) (0.00653) 
SEN -0.00658 -0.00292 0.0000662 -0.00151 0.00291 0.00537 
 (0.00772) (0.00619) (0.00895) (0.00800) (0.00622) (0.00912) 
Female -0.00780 -0.00549 -0.00206 -0.00647 -0.00402 -0.000751 
 (0.00460) (0.00454) (0.00493) (0.00476) (0.00467) (0.00508) 
EAL 0.0491** 0.0388* 0.0296 0.0635*** 0.0555** 0.0448* 
 (0.0189) (0.0216) (0.0204) (0.0200) (0.0228) (0.0216) 
Asian -0.00610 0.00901 0.0230 0.0109 0.0283 0.0403 
 (0.0341) (0.0331) (0.0381) (0.0292) (0.0265) (0.0314) 
Black 0.0457** 0.0467** 0.0539** 0.0739*** 0.0777*** 0.0819*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0183) (0.0212) (0.0240) (0.0221) (0.0236) 
N 114162 114162 114162 114394 114394 114394 
R2 0.044 0.055 0.085 0.037 0.046 0.074 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
All regressions contain LA level fixed effects. Standard Errors are clustered at the LA level.
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Table 8 Panels A and B: Comparison of School Attended and Hypothetical Reassignment: Panel A: Secondary Schools 
 (Quintiles are defined in terms of %5A*-C(EM) results) 
 
Reassignment by %5A*- C (EM) 
 Quintile 
Attended 
Quintile Assigned 
 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL 
Lowest 63 339 400 210 15 1027 
2 0 615 1195 677 307 2794 
3 0 0 263 724 796 1783 
4 0 0 0 302 379 681 
Highest 0 0 0 0 162 162 
TOTAL 63 954 1858 1913 1659 6447 
 
Reassignment by CVA 
Quintile 
Attended 
Quintile Assigned 
 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL 
Lowest 14 150 135 47 53 399 
2 120 1002 848 458 687 3115 
3 81 872 1057 762 953 3725 
4 24 477 505 564 472 2042 
Highest 68 538 294 211 427 1539 
TOTAL 307 3039 2839 2042 2592 10819 
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Table 8 Panels A and B: Comparison of School Attended and Hypothetical Reassignment: Panel B: Primary Schools  
(Quintiles are defined in terms of KS2 results) 
 
Reassignment by KS2  
Quintile 
Attended 
Quintile Assigned 
 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL 
Lowest 407 1446 1349 892 630 4724 
2 0 233 871 937 696 2734 
3 0 0 151 587 590 1328 
4 0 0 0 116 415 531 
Highest 0 0 0 0 78 531 
TOTAL 407 1679 2371 2532 2406 9395 
 
Reassignment by CVA 
Quintile 
Attended 
Quintile Assigned 
 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL 
Lowest 930 760 707 650 388 3435 
2 586 616 555 635 487 2879 
3 417 552 532 631 543 2675 
4 274 395 439 495 541 2144 
Highest 181 215 318 491 469 1674 
TOTAL 2388 2538 2551 2902 2428 12807 
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Table 9 Panels A and B: Potential grade gains from hypothetical reassignmentPanel A: Secondary Schools 
 
Reassignment by %5A*- C (EM) 
   
Reassigned Pupils Mean GCSE 
point score  
LA No. Pupils 
No. 
Reassignments 
At Original 
School  
At Assigned 
School Mean Gain in LA 
Stockton-on-Tees 2026 244 280.4 310.6 30.2 
Surrey 10410 1247 313.5 332.9 19.4 
Hampshire 13666 937 321.4 331.5 10.1 
Durham 5457 461 314.8 323.3 8.5 
North Lincolnshire 1960 467 326.5 333.7 7.2 
Lancashire 12940 1318 307.3 313.5 6.2 
Wirral 3699 280 284.9 290.1 5.2 
Norfolk 8552 142 302.5 306.7 4.3 
Bradford 5407 1226 309.0 311.9 2.9 
Wakefield 3562 125 318.5 318.5 0.1 
Predicted Capped GCSE scores 
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Reassignment by CVA 
   
Reassigned Pupils Mean GCSE 
point score  
LA No. Pupils 
No. 
Reassignments 
At Original 
School  
At Assigned 
School 
Mean Gain in 
LA 
Devon 7642 954 317.9 338.7 20.8 
Lancashire 12938 902 314.0 329.3 15.3 
Bexley 3086 1269 345.5 359.8 14.3 
Surrey 10410 1462 324.1 338.0 13.9 
Derbyshire 8411 997 322.7 331.9 9.1 
Hampshire 13662 1047 318.7 327.8 9.1 
Cambridgeshire 5694 362 314.7 323.4 8.7 
North Lincolnshire 1960 298 327.9 335.9 8.0 
Swindon 1916 177 331.1 338.6 7.5 
Norfolk 8551 218 304.1 311.2 7.1 
Wiltshire 5021 172 330.3 337.3 7.0 
Wirral 3697 237 332.4 338.2 5.8 
Durham 5457 281 328.3 333.4 5.0 
Cumbria 5378 229 321.1 325.7 4.6 
Wigan 3800 411 323.7 327.1 3.4 
Kent 15945 1085 346.0 329.3 3.4 
Rotherham 3224 263 315.8 315.5 -0.3 
Trafford 2904 455 366.0 362.7 -3.3 
Predicted Capped GCSE scores 
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Table 9 Panels A and B: Potential grade gains from hypothetical reassignment:  Panel B: Primary Schools 
Reassignment by KS2 
   
Reassigned Pupils Mean Norm’d 
KS2 score  
LA No. Pupils 
No. 
Reassignments 
At Original 
School  
At Assigned 
School Mean Gain in LA 
Barnsley 4202 83 -0.37 0.06 0.43 
Leicester 5452 173 -0.47 -0.07 0.40 
Wiltshire 8199 304 -0.20 0.13 0.33 
Nottingham 4565 237 -0.34 -0.02 0.33 
Sunderland 4366 88 -0.33 -0.03 0.30 
Leeds 13113 361 -0.16 0.13 0.29 
Cornwall 5911 213 -0.18 0.10 0.28 
Norfolk 6003 188 -0.15 0.12 0.28 
St. Helens 3694 204 -0.09 0.18 0.17 
Kingston upon Hull, City of 5030 197 -0.33 -0.07 0.26 
North Yorkshire 6499 262 0.15 0.40 0.26 
Shropshire 3785 182 0.07 0.32 0.26 
Blackburn with Darwen 3019 85 -0.33 -0.07 0.26 
Walsall 4790 140 -0.11 0.15 0.25 
Nottinghamshire 12057 404 -0.06 0.20 0.25 
Stockton-on-Tees 3829 156 -0.07 0.18 0.25 
Leicestershire 9151 329 0.01 00.26 0.25 
East Sussex 7288 200 -0.07 0.17 0.24 
Cambridgeshire 9628 350 -0.09 0.15 0.23 
Lancashire 19928 586 -0.10 0.13 0.23 
Kent 23343 650 -0.26 -0.03 0.22 
Hampshire 10914 325 0.05 0.27 0.22 
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East Riding of Yorkshire 3577 119 0.02 0.23 0.22 
Liverpool 5534 373 -0.38 -0.17 0.21 
Herefordshire 2907 48 -0.11 0.10 0.20 
Devon 11054 373 -0.03 -.17 0.20 
Oxfordshire 11716 284 -0.07 0.13 0.20 
Northamptonshire 9725 246 -0.19 0.00 0.20 
Stoke-on-Trent 3089 66 -0.04 0.16 0.20 
York 2993 118 -0.02 0.18 0.20 
Rotherham 3999 210 -0.32 -0.12 0.20 
Derbyshire 8083 343 -0.01 0.18 0.19 
Wolverhampton 4372 130 -0.39 -0.21 0.18 
Dudley 5381 131 -0.22 -0.05 0.17 
Doncaster 5030 206 -0.09 0.07 0.16 
Lincolnshire 11220 527 0.01 0.17 0.16 
Cumbria 4865 136 0.17 0.32 0.15 
Wirral 5881 194 -0.01 0.13 0.14 
Knowsley 3035 174 0.07 0.15 0.09 
Predicted Normalised KS2 scores 
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Reassignment by CVA 
   
Reassigned Pupils Mean Norm’d 
KS2 score  
LA No. Pupils 
No. 
Reassignments 
At Original 
School  
At Assigned 
School Mean Gain in LA 
Nottingham 3480 266 -0.42 -0.03 0.38 
Wakefield 1735 116 0.00 0.33 0.33 
Portsmouth 864 52 -0.26 0.06 0.31 
Barnsley 2295 132 -0.25 -0.06 0.19 
Wiltshire 7532 497 -0.04 0.14 0.18 
Sunderland 2785 128 -0.11 0.06 0.17 
Cambridgeshire 9176 471 -0.06 0.21 0.15 
Leicester 4115 185 -0.26 -0.11 0.15 
Wokingham 1333 82 0.19 0.33 0.14 
Kent 22382 947 -0.19 -0.06 0,13 
Cumbria 3753 218 0.15 0.28 0.13 
Leicestershire 7789 463 0.13 0.26 0.13 
Lancashire 11815 806 0.13 0.25 0.13 
Leeds 8139 476 -0.10 0.02 0.12 
Lincolnshire 10055 707 0.17 0.28 0.11 
Liverpool 4308 427 -0.20 -0.09 0.11 
East Riding of Yorkshire 2382 150 0.03 0.14 0.11 
Nottinghamshire 9591 575 0.09 0.20 0.11 
Cornwall 3909 284 0.01 0.12 0.11 
Walsall 3610 262 -0.10 0.00 0.10 
Oxfordshire 8627 410 0.07 0.16 0.10 
Stockton-on-Tees 2159 156 0.21 0.31 0.10 
Northamptonshire 7336 459 0.00 0.10 0.10 
North Yorkshire 5081 401 0.19 0.28 0.09 
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Derbyshire 6946 516 0.11 0.19 0.08 
Hampshire 10225 598 0.10 0.18 0.08 
Shropshire 3422 211 0.23 0.30 0.07 
Wolverhampton 3082 163 -0.10 -0.30 0.07 
Norfolk 4933 399 -0.08 -0.01 0.07 
Doncaster 4313 225 0.07 0.13 0.06 
Newcastle Upon Tyne 1968 197 0.05 0.10 0.05 
Devon 9980 589 0.09 0.14 0.04 
East Sussex 5314 265 0.05 0.08 0.03 
St. Helens 3704 233 0.13 0.14 0.01 
Rotherham 3748 218 -0.13 -0.12 0.00 
Stoke-on-Trent 1096 66 -0.27 -0.27 0.00 
Bath & N East Somerset 1165 90 0.16 0.14 -0.02 
Knowsley 3044 248 0.12 0.09 -0.03 
York 2603 193 0.10 0.07 -0.03 
Kingston Upon Hull, City of 3505 120 -0.09 -0.12 -0.03 
Wirral 5959 357 0.23 0.19 -0.04 
Dudley 2403 136 0.09 -0.01 -0.10 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1 Panels A-F: Reassignment results: student-level outcomes 
Panel A: Secondary Schools (Reassignment using %5A*-C(EM); outcome measure 
GCSE Grades)  
 
 
Panel B: Secondary Schools (Reassignment using %5A*-C(EM); outcome measure 
GCSE Points)  
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Panel C: Secondary Schools (Reassignment using CVA; outcome measure GCSE 
Grades)  
 
 
Panel D: Secondary Schools (Reassignment using CVA); outcome measure GCSE 
Points)  
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Panel E: Primary Schools (Reassignment using KS2; outcome measure norm’ed KS2 
Points)  
 
 
Panel F: Primary Schools (Reassignment using CVA; outcome measure norm’ed KS2 
Points)  
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Annex 1 Tables defining ‘local’ schools 
 
The table for defining ‘local’ primary schools is as follows: 
No. Local 
Schools 
(in 
LLSOA) 
1+ 2+ 3+ 4+ 5+ 
1 756 5,798 12,014 16,566 18,841 
2 2,429 9,682 11,477 9,501 6,516 
3 4,483 8,354 5,183 2,334 966 
4 5,381 4,531 1,445 388 105 
5+ 18,816 2,923 408 76 21 
Total 31,865 31,467 30,527 28,865 26,449 
 
The table for defining ‘local’ secondary schools is as follows: 
No. 
Schools in 
LLSOA 
catchment 
1+ 2+ 3+ 4+ 5+ 
1 2,479 7,544 12,580 16,465 18,615 
2 4,350 9,309 10,315 8,542 6,054 
3 5,603 7,009 4,540 2,157 864 
4 5,331 3,874 1,336 323 93 
5+ 13,743 2435 374 57 7 
Total 
LLSOAs 
31,506 30,364 29,145 27,544 25,633 
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